Hierarchical decision making with supply chain applications by Liu, Xiangrong
Hierarchical Decision Making with Supply Chain Applications
A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty
of
Drexel University
by
Xiangrong Liu
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
June 2010
c© Copyright June 2010
Xiangrong Liu.
This work is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
ShareAlike license. The license is available at http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-sa/2.0/.
ii
Acknowledgements
In the past 6 years, I received a great deal of support, help and encouragement from my
advisor, dissertation committee members, professors, colleagues, friends and family. This
dissertation is dedicated to all of them, who spent the time and effort to accompany me in
my journey through these years.
I sincerely appreciate my advisor, Dr. Hande Y. Benson, who stimulated my curiosity
in all my projects and kept my enthusiasm for research at a high level. Her valuable advice,
insightful comments and scholarly guidance make this dissertation complete. In view of her
pleasant personality and integrity, I really enjoyed every meeting with her.
I am deeply grateful to my co-advisor, Dr. Avijit Banerjee. As the first professor in-
troducing me to the Ph.D program, he shared many of his experiences with me. I always
admired his knowledge, wisdom and intelligence. I hope that my professional accomplish-
ments will make him proud of me.
Dr. Kim provided me with his strong spiritual support and guidance, encouraging me
to develop optimistic outlook on life. I also appreciate my collaboration with Dr. Partovi,
whose strong affinity for in academic life has inspired me. My deep gratitude goes to Dr.
Hindelang, not only for his continuous support, but for the opportunities he provided for
me to grow. I also want to thank Dr. Radson, Dr. Maragah, and Ms. Fingers for having
directed me to a teaching career.
I also wish to thank all the faculty members, staff, colleagues and students, both present
and past, in the Decision Sciences Department at Drexel University for their assistance and
fellowship. I would also like to extend my thanks to my friends, who helped me in many
different ways in accomplishing my task.
iii
Finally, I am greatly indebted to my parents, brother, sister-in-law and other relatives
for their endless love and support. Thank you for giving me the peace of mind and plenty
of enthusiastic energy. This journey becomes joyful and meaningful because of all of you.
iv
Table of Contents
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
ABSTRACT .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
0.1 List of Symbols Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
1. Introduction to Hierarchical Decision Making (HDM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 General Formulation and Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2.1 Linear Bilevel Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.2 Nonlinear Bilevel Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.3 Discrete Bilevel Problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.4 Other Categories of BP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Characteristics of BP and its Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.1 Characteristics of BP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.2 Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Differences between HDM and Other Multi-Objective Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2. Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1 Solution Methods for Continuous Bilevel Programming Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.1 Vertex-enumeration Based Algorithm .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.2 Gradient-Based Algorithms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1.3 Discrete Bilevel Problem Algorithm .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2 Applications of Hierarchical Decision Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2.1 Agriculture Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2.2 Resource Allocation Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.2.3 Pricing Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2.4 Transportation Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.3 Literature Review for HDM Problems in Closed-loop Supply Chains . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4 Literature Review for HDM Problems in Biofuel Supply Chains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
v2.5 Conclusions of Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3. Hierarchical Decision Making Problems in Closed-loop Supply Chains . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3 Profit Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3.1 The Retailer’s Profit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3.2 The Manufacturer’s Profit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3.3 The Supply Chain’s Profit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4 Development of Hierarchical Decision Making Models and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4.1 Retailer Controlled Model with pw Given . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4.2 Manufacturer Controlled Model with pw Given. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4.3 Manufacturer Controlled Model with pw Unknown. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4.4 Centralized Model for Supply Chain Optimality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.5 A Numerical Illustration and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.6.1 Selling Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.6.2 Reimbursement Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.6.3 Order Quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.6.4 Supply Chain Profits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.6.5 Retailer’s Share in Supply Chain Profit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.7 Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4. Discrete Hierarchical Decision Making Problems in Biofuel Supply Chains . . . . . . . . . 69
4.1 Introduction of the Biofuel Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2.1 The Goverment Model (Upper Level) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2.2 The Farms Model (Lower Level) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3 Solution Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3.1 Pattern Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
vi
4.3.2 Nonsmooth Nonlinear Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.4 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4.1 Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4.2 Computational Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5. Conclusions and Future Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.1 General Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.2 Suggested Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
BIBLIOGRAPHY .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Appendix A: Proof of Propositions in Remanufacturing Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Appendix B: Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Appendix C: Figures and Graphics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
VITA .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
vii
List of Tables
B.1 Summary of Results(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
B.2 Summary of Results(2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
B.3 Parameters Table (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B.4 Parameters Table (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B.5 Parameters Table (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
B.6 Solution of the Numerical Example Without Fixed Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
B.7 Solution of the Numerical Example with Fixed Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
B.8 Computational Efficiency of the Proposed Solution Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
viii
List of Figures
C.1 The Recovery and Remanufacturing Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
C.2 Inventory Time Plot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
C.3 ps vs. Parameters in the Centralized Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
C.4 ps vs. Parameters in the Retailer Controlled Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
C.5 ps vs. Parameters in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw given) . . . . . . . . . . . 109
C.6 ps vs. Parameters in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw not given) . . . . . . 110
C.7 rc vs. Parameters in the Centralized Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
C.8 rc vs. Parameters in the Retailer Controlled Situation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
C.9 rc vs. Parameters in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw given) . . . . . . . . . . . 113
C.10 rc vs. Parameters in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw not given) . . . . . . 114
C.11 Q vs. Parameters in the Centralized Situation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
C.12 Q vs. Parameters in the Retailer Controlled Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
C.13 Q vs. Parameters in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw given) . . . . . . . . . . . 117
C.14 Q vs. Parameters in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw not given) . . . . . . 118
C.15 Supply Chain Profits in the Retailer Controlled Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
C.16 Supply Chain Profits in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw given) . . . . . . . 120
C.17 Supply Chain Profits in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw given) . . . . . . . 121
C.18 Supply Chain Profits in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw not given) . . . 122
C.19 Πr/Πs in the Retailer Controlled Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
C.20 Πr/Πs in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw given) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
C.21 Πr/Πs in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw not given) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
ix
Abstract
Hierarchical Decision Making with Supply Chain Applications
Xiangrong Liu
Advisor: Hande Benson, Ph.D.; Avijit Banerjee, Ph.D.
Hierarchical decision making is a decision system, where multiple decision makers are
involved and the process has a structure on the order of levels. It gains interest not only
from a theoretical point of view but also from real practice. Its wide applications in supply
chain management are the main focus of this dissertation.
The first part of the work discusses an application of continuous bilevel programming in
a remanufacturing system. Under intense competitive pressures to lower production costs,
coupled with increasing environmental concerns, used products can often be collected via
customer returns to retailers in supply chains and remanufactured by producers, in order
to bring them back into “as-new” condition for resale. In this part, hierarchical models are
developed to determine optimal decisions involving inventory replenishment, retail pricing
and collection price for returns. Based on the simplified assumption of a single manufacturer
and a single retailer dealing with a single recoverable item under deterministic conditions,
all of these decisions are examined in an integrated manner. Models depicting decentral-
ized, as well as centralized policies are explored. Analytical results are derived and detailed
sensitivity analysis is performed via an extensive set of numerical computations.
In the second part of this dissertation, a discrete bilevel problem is illustrated by in-
vestigating a biofuel production problem. The issues of governmental incentives, industry
decisions of price, and farm management of land are incorporated. While fixed costs are
natural components of decision making in operations management, such discrete phenomena
have not received sufficient research attention in the current literature on bilevel program-
ming, due to a variety of theoretical and algorithmic difficulties. When such costs are taken
xinto account, it is not easy to derive optimality conditions and explore convergence proper-
ties due to discontinuities and the combinatorial nature of this problem, which is NP-hard.
In order to solve this problem, a derivative-free search technique is used to arrive at a so-
lution to this bilevel problem. A new heuristic methodology is developed, which integrates
sensitivity analysis and warm-starts to improve the efficiency of the algorithm.

xii
0.1 List of Symbols Used
Notation used for literature review
x = vector of decision variables controlled in an upper level problem(ULP)
y = vector of decision variables controlled in a lower level problem(LLP)
s = vector of slack variables controlled in a LLP
λ = vector of Lagrange multipliers in a LLP
z = vector of decision variables in a bilevel problem, z = (x, y, s, λ)
X = linear feasible set for decision variables controlled in an ULP
Y = linear feasible set for decision variables controlled in a LLP
F = objective function for an ULP
G = constraint functions for an ULP
f = objective function for a LLP
g = constraint functions for a LLP
Cx = objective coefficients for decision variables x in a linear ULP
Cy = objective coefficients for decision variables y in a linear ULP
cx = objective coefficients for decision variables x in a linear LLP
cy = objective coefficients for decision variables y in a linear LLP
B = right hand side of constraints in a linear ULP
b = right hand side of constraints in a linear LLP
Ax = constraint matrix for decision variables x in a linear ULP
Ay = constraint matrix for decision variables y in a linear ULP
ax = constraint matrix for decision variables x in a linear LLP
ay = constraint matrix for decision variables y in a linear LLP
d = directional derivative
dx = directional derivative for x
dy = directional derivative for y
P = coefficient matrix in a quadratic upper level problem
Q = coefficient matrix in a quadratic lower level problem
R = set of real numbers
Z = set of integers
L(x, y, λ) = Lagrangian function
xiii
k = index of iterations
r = radius of neighborhood
 = tolerance
ϑo(x) = best-case objective value of the ULP for a fixed x (optimistic)
ϑp(x) = worst-case objective value of the ULP for a fixed x (optimistic)
Φ(x) = penalty function of the objective value in the upper level problem
κ = maximum value of the upper level variable
Γ(x) = feasible region of the lower level variable given x
<(x) = reaction set for the lower level variable given x
k = step length at the kth iteration
V(x, r) = the neighborhood of x with a radius of r
M = a large positive constant
k = iteration index
INT = interior
BD = boundary
F¯ = upper bound for the upper level objective function value
F = lower bound for the upper level objective function value
F ′ = the first derivative for the upper level objective function
f ′ = the first derivative for the lower level objective function
f = lower bound for the lower level objective function value
B = index set for basic variables
N = index set for nonbasic variables
Notation used for biofuel production model
V = set of biofuels
E = set of farms
C = set of food crops
D = set of nonfood crops
D(v) = subset of nonfood crops used to make biofuel v
D′ = subset of nonfood crops with subsidies
τv = government tax credit given to industry for biofuel v ($/ton)
pde = price paid by industry to farm e for the land assigned
to produce nonfood crop d($/ton)
xiv
xce = area allocated to food crop c by farm e (acres)
xnde = area allocated to nonfood crop d by farm e (acres)
xfe = area set aside as fallow by farm e (acres)
qde = binary variable to decide whether farm e will plant nonfood crop
αdve = conversion rate from the land assigned to nonfood crop d in farm e
to biofuel v (ton/acre)
γ = set-aside payment for fallow land ($/acre)
ρ = minimum percentage of set-aside land expected by the government
for nonfood crops
θ = percentage of arable land required to be set aside for nonfood crops or fallow
σe = total arable land available on farm e (acres)
uv = upper bounds on production of biofuel v from certain nonfood crops (ton)
pive = threshold for the industry price ($/ton)
mce = gross margin for food crop c grown on farm e ($/acre)
cde = net production cost for nonfood crop d on farm e ($/acre)
χde = upper bound on percentage of land permitted for nonfood crop d on farm e
δ = maximum percentage of land expected by government for fallow
tde = fixed cost for farm e for planting nonfood crop d ($)
Notation used for remanufacturing model(retailer)
d = demand rate of the product (units/time unit)
Sr = fixed ordering cost for retail stock replenishment($/order)
hr = inventory holding cost of the product ($/unit/time unit)
hrr = inventory holding cost of the used (returned) product ($/unit/time unit)
rc = unit reimbursement to customers for returns ($/unit)
ps = unit selling price of the product (new or remanufactured) ($/unit)
x = rate at which customers return the used item to the retailer (units/time unit)
X = total quantity of returns in a replenishment cycle (units)
xv
Notation used for remanufacturing model(manufacturer)
m = manufacturing or remanufacturing rate of the product(unit/time unit)
Sm = fixed manufacturing/remanufacturing setup cost per replenishment lot ($/setup)
Srm = total fixed cost of shipping a replenishment lot of new products to the retailer
and transporting the returned items back to the manufacturing facility ($/cycle)
Si = fixed ordering cost of inputs for manufacturing and remanufacturing ($/lot)
hm = inventory holding cost of new or remanufactured product ($/unit/time unit)
hi = inventory holding cost of input materials necessary for the production of a unit
of the new product($/unit/time unit)
hir = inventory holding cost of input materials necessary for remanufacturing a unit
of the used product($/unit/time unit)
rm = transfer price paid to retailer by manufacturer for collecting used products($/unit)
pw = wholesale price charged to retailer for the new product ($/unit);
cs = variable transportation cost of shipping new product to the retailer($/unit)
cr = variable cost of transporting, cleaning, preparation, etc for returned items($/unit)
cm = variable cost of manufacturing new product ($/unit)
crm = variable cost of remanufacturing a returned used product into a new one($/unit)
Notation used for remanufacturing model(common to both)
T = inventory replenishment cycle time, common to retailer and manufacturer
(time units)
Q = replenishment quantity consisting of new and/or remanufactured items
(units)
11. Introduction to Hierarchical Decision Making (HDM)
1.1 Background
Hierarchical decision making is a decision making system, where multiple decision makers
are involved and the process has a hierarchical structure, i.e., decision making on the order
of levels. Usually, decision makers in the higher level make decisions first. After observing
the decisions in the higher level, decision makers in the lower level react with their optimal
strategies. With the assumption of perfect information about the lower level, the decision
makers in the higher level could anticipate the strategies from the lower level before their
decision making. As a result, the decision makers will take responses from the lower level
into consideration before the upper level decisions are made.
We call the decision makers in the upper level problem the leaders. Correspondingly, the
decision makers in the lower level are called the followers. The leaders usually are the players
who have more power and more information in this system. For example, government in
public economics, regional system operators in the electricity market, and system planners
in transportation lend to act as leaders. On the contrary, the followers often have less power
and less information and are put into reactive situations. Comparatively, industry sectors,
power generators and arbitragers in the electricity market and the travellers in the trans-
portation system generally act as followers.
The hierarchical decision making process in economics is formally referred to as a Stack-
elberg game. Therefore, the discussion of the development of hierarchical decision making
should date back to the introduction of the Stackelberg game. The concept was first in-
troduced by Von Stackelberg[74]. As outlined in the Economics literature, the Stackelberg
game, traditionally, can be solved by backward deduction. However, backward deduction is
restricted by problem size and characteristics of decision variables. With widespread appli-
2cations of Stackelberg games in the real word, hierarchical decision making systems become
more and more popular, and more and more complex as well. Decision systems may not
only include continuous variables, but also extend to include discrete variables, timing con-
cerns and uncertainty decisions, which add difficulties to computation and interpretation
efforts. New mathematical models and systematic study of solution methods which are able
to address such evolving situations have become necessary.
Hierarchical programming is a mathematical framework to represent Stackelberg games.
It has multiple optimization problems at different levels. If the number of levels is limited
to two, then this type of hierarchical programming is called a Bilevel Problem. To simplify
the terminology, we use BP to denote “bilevel problem” or “bilevel programming” in the
following text. Actually, no matter how multi-players act in the lower level or how com-
plex the system is, all hierarchical programming problems are able to be restructured as
a two-level problem, which means that a large-scale system could always be decomposed
into several smaller and manageable subproblems. As a simplified expression of hierarchical
problems[6], BP also can be treated as a special case of mathematical programs with the
optimization problem in the constraints, which is used by [18, 19, 20]. The discussion of BP
becomes the core of solving multi-level/hierarchical programming problems since BP is a
simplified hierarchical problem.
1.2 General Formulation and Categories
The terminology of bilevel programming was first introduced by Candler[24]. In the past
30 years, the area has grown fast with research on linear and nonlinear programming. Inter-
ested readers might refer to the books such as [71], [10] and [31]. The general formulation
of BP is:
3min
x
F (x, y)
s.t. G(x, y) ≤ 0
y ∈ argmin
y′
{f(x, y′) : g(x, y′) ≤ 0},
(1.2.1)
where the problem has two levels. x ∈ X ⊆ Rn1 is the set of the upper level decision vari-
ables, decided by the upper level decision maker and y ∈ Y ⊆ Rn2 is the set of the lower
level decision variables, decided by the lower level decision maker. Similarly, the functions
F : Rn1×n2 → R and f : Rn1×n2 → R are called the upper-level objective function and the
lower-level objective function, separately, while G : Rn1×n2 → Rm1 , and g : Rn1×n2 → Rm2
are the upper-level constraints and the lower-level constraints, respectively.
According to the different characteristics of objective functions and constraints, BP can
take various forms. For example, the upper level objective function in (1.2.1) can take the
form F (x) without the lower level decision variable y. It is also possible that the upper level
decision variables do not influence the constraints in the lower level so that the lower level
constraint functions can be written as g(y), while the problem (1.2.1) is general enough to
accommodate a wide range of problems. With the variation in the structure of the problems,
the corresponding algorithms change significantly and computational complexity of imple-
mentation can differ. Therefore, we will give sufficient attention to special cases of (1.2.1)
when we delve into algorithms.
If the objective function and constraints in (1.2.1) are linear, BP can be classified as a
Linear Bilevel Problem(LBP). Otherwise, it is called a Nonlinear Bilevel Problem(NBP).
In each type, some typical problems with certain features are discussed in the next sections.
Besides, if there exists discrete variables in the problem, whether in objective functions or
in constraints, whether in the upper level or in the lower level, these kinds of problems are
called Discrete Bilevel Problems(DBP).
41.2.1 Linear Bilevel Programming
If the objective functions F , f and the constraints G, g are all linear, (1.2.1) can be cat-
egorized as a linear bilevel programming problem(LBP). Bialas and Karwan[17] summarize
geometric characteristics and track the development of related algorithms. They further
categorize LBP into two classes: linear resource control problems and linear price control
problems. The linear resource control problem is a type of BP where the decision variables
in the upper level are not the coefficients in the lower level problem:
min
x
F (x, y) = Cxx+ Cyy
s.t. G(x, y) = Axx+Ayy −B ≤ 0
y ∈ argmin
y′
{f(x, y′) = cxx+ cyy′ : g(x, y′) = axx+ ayy′ − b ≤ 0}.
(1.2.2)
This kind of problem may be applicable in many areas where limited resources are dis-
tributed among different entities, for a example, governmental budgets allocation among
various sectors.
The linear price control problem has an upper level objective function determined by
both x and y. The mathematical expression is:
min
x
F (x, y) = Cxx+ Cyy
s.t. G(x, y) = Axx+Ayy −B ≤ 0
y ∈ argmin
y′
{f(x, y′) = xT y′ : g(x, y′) = axx+ ayy′ − b ≤ 0}.
(1.2.3)
Note that the inner product in the lower level objective function makes the upper level deci-
sion control the coefficients in the lower level. Given the decision in the upper level problem,
the lower level becomes a linear problem. This problem has a very wide application are in
the analysis of tax and subsidy programs.
51.2.2 Nonlinear Bilevel Programming
If F or G are nonlinear in x, or if f or g are nonlinear in y, then (1.2.1) turns into a
nonlinear bilevel problem(NBP). Since LBP is NP-hard, the further complexity of NBP
has limited development in this area. However, the Quadratic Bilevel Problem (QBP)
has received a lot of attention due to its special structure, which makes most algorithms
implementable and robust. Generally, a QBP can be expressed as
min
x
F (x, y) = Cxx+ Cyy + (x, y)TP (x, y)
s.t. G(x, y) = Axx+Ayy ≤ B
y ∈ argmin
y′
{f(x, y) = cxx+ cyy′ + (x, y′)TQ(x, y′) : g(x, y′) = axx+ ayy′ − b ≤ 0}.
(1.2.4)
1.2.3 Discrete Bilevel Problem
If a BP has discrete variables, the problem is called a Discrete Bilevel Problem(DBP).
These discrete variables can be integer-valued or binary, or represent other discrete choices,
and they can appear on either of the two levels of the BP. The existence of discrete variables
adds computational complexity to the problem.
1.2.4 Other Categories of BP
One special case in BP is the min-max problem. The leader(minimizer) tries to find
the optimal values of its decision variables to minimize an objective function, maximized
with respect to the follower(maximizer)’s variables. The decision makers consider the worst
case scenario. Meanwhile, both the maximizer and the minimizer have the same objective
function F (x, y) = f(x, y) and are subject to the same joint constraints G(x, y) = g(x, y).
Then the min-max problem can be written as:
6max
x
min
y
F (x, y)
s.t. G(x, y) ≤ 0.
(1.2.5)
Another special case is a Stackelberg game with multiple agents at each level. This
is a very common problem in economic markets of operations and contains problems with
oligopolistic competition where a Nash equilibrium may be sought among all the players at
the same level.
Cooperative games, where the upper level and the lower level can cooperate to attain the
goal, is also a special case of BP. It also belongs to the area of multi-objective optimization.
Usually, a centralized planner is assumed before the optimization of both participants. We
will examine it with models in our remanufacturing system in Chapter 3. Meanwhile, we also
focus on the non-cooperative game with applications in biofuel production. Non-cooperative
means that there exists conflicts between the objective of the upper level and that of the
lower level.
1.3 Characteristics of BP and its Solutions
1.3.1 Characteristics of BP
We can relax the feasible region for (1.2.1) without considering the optimal reaction of
y to x. Then the relaxed feasible region for the pair (x, y) is defined as
Γ = {(x, y) ∈ Rn1 ×Rn2 : G(x, y) ≤ 0 and g(x, y) ≤ 0} , (1.3.1)
which is generally assumed to be bounded and nonempty so that the original problem is not
trivial and does have a optimal solution. For a given x¯, we can have a lower-level feasible
set corresponding to x¯ as
7Γ(x¯) = {y ∈ Rn2 : g(x¯, y) ≤ 0} . (1.3.2)
If the lower level specifies its optimal reaction to a given x¯, the set of optimal y is called
the lower-level reaction set as:
<(x¯) = argmin {f(x¯, y′) : y′ ∈ Γ(x¯)} . (1.3.3)
This set groups all the best strategies of y for any given x¯. Consequently, we can have the
reaction set of y defined in their feasible region for all the given x defined in the upper-level
feasible set as:
IR = {(x, y) ∈ Rn1 ×Rn2 : G(x, y) ≤ 0, y ∈ <(x)} . (1.3.4)
The set is called as Induced Region or Inducible Region. If the upper level decision makers
choose actions to optimize their objective functions within this inducible region, the solu-
tions will be optimal for the original bilevel problem. Notice that the inducible region is
usually neither convex nor connected.
At some given x, the lower level may have multiple solutions which are all optimal for
the lower level problem with the same objective function. This is the same as saying that
the reaction set of the lower level problem <(x) is not a singleton. In this case, if the leader
has full control over the lower level feasible set Γ(x) so that he can choose the action which
benefits himself most, we call the scenario an optimistic situation.
A solution (x∗, y∗) is the local optimistic solution (LOS) if the lower level optimum
corresponding to the value of x∗ is always less than that from the other lower level optima
for x in the neighborhood V (x∗, r) of x∗ with a positive radius r. Let us define ϑo(x) =
min
y
{F (x, y) : y ∈ <(x)}. As a result, the sufficient conditions for a LOS are:
8x∗ ∈ V (x∗, r) ∩X
y∗ ∈ <(x∗)
G(x∗, y∗) ≤ 0
ϑo(x∗) ≤ ϑo(x) for all x ∈ V (x∗, r) ∩X.
(1.3.5)
If the above requirement is also met in all of X, we call it a global optimistic solution(GOS),
which means
x∗ ∈ X
y∗ ∈ <(x∗)
G(x∗, y∗) ≤ 0
ϑo(x∗) ≤ ϑo(x).
(1.3.6)
Relatively, if the coordination between the leader and the follower does not exist, or the
leader is risk-averse and avoids any loss at the least, then we redefine
ϑp(x) = max
y
{F (x, y) : y ∈ <(x)} .
A point (x∗, y∗) is called a Local Pessimistic Solution(LPS), if it follows the following
conditions within V (x∗, r):
x∗ ∈ V (x∗, r) ∩X
y∗ ∈ <(x∗)
G(x∗, y∗) ≤ 0
ϑp(x∗) ≤ ϑp(x) for all x ∈ V (x∗, r) ∩X;
(1.3.7)
Similarly, a Global Pessimistic Solution(GPS) has the following properties:
9x∗ ∈ X
y∗ ∈ <(x∗)
G(x∗, y∗) ≤ 0
ϑp(x∗) ≤ ϑp(x).
(1.3.8)
The particular choice among these options is determined by the power distributed between
the leader and the follower. If the follower is strong, the leader can only take the action to
reduce its loss in the worst case. However, if the leader is much stronger, the control he has
leads to the best scenario he wants.
1.3.2 Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Conditions
The solution methods to optimize BP, especially NBP, rely heavily on Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions. KKT conditions for the lower level problem can be
defined if the lower level problem is convex and regular. We can integrate KKT optimality
conditions into the upper level problem so that the BP becomes a single-level problem. The
formulation is:
min
x,y
F (x, y)
s.t. G(x, y) ≤ 0
g(x, y) ≤ 0
λg(x, y) = 0
λ ≥ 0
∇yL(x, y, λ) = 0,
(1.3.9)
where
L(x, y, λ) = f(x, y) +
m2∑
i=1
λigi(x, y). (1.3.10)
To ensure that an optimal solution to the general nonlinear bilevel programming problem
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can be obtained by (1.3.9), we set up the following sufficient optimality conditions for the
lower level problem [67]:
1. The bilevel problem is well posed, i.e., at any given x¯, the optimal lower level solution
y(x¯) and the corresponding multipliers λ(x¯) are unique. Otherwise, the leader cannot
pose his decision within the set of y(x), which causes an ill-posed problem;
2. The gradients of all the active constraints in the lower level are linearly independent,
i.e., at any given x¯, the corresponding Lagrange multipliers λ(x¯) are unique.
3. Strict complementarity holds, i.e., the multipliers of any active inequality lower level
constraints are positive.
4. The second-order sufficiency conditions are satisfied, which means
{
dT∇2yL(x, y(x), λ(x))d > 0 : ∀d ∈ E(x), d 6= 0
}
, (1.3.11)
where E(x) = {d ∈ Rm2 |∇yL(x, y, λ)d = 0} is the tangent space at y(x).
It should be noted that the new problem is not always exactly equivalent to the original
problem, only in the optimistic scenario. There does not exist any efficient way to apply
this approach to the pessimistic case. Also, even with the ideal assumptions, (1.3.9) is still
hard to solve. The major difficulty exists because of the complementary slackness condition
λ · g(x, y) = 0 in the KKT conditions of the lower-level problem.
1.4 Differences between HDM and Other Multi-Objective Models
Hierarchical Decision Making describes a decision making system with multiple stages,
each of which has one or more decision makers. Although Goal Programming Problems
also have multiple objectives, they differ from Hierarchical Programming Problem in the
sense that goal programming usually only has one decision maker. The decision makers
in goal programming can balance the trade-off among several objectives so that in the
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end the maximum utility can be realized. If the different levels of a hierarchical decision
making framework can be integrated in a systematic manner, or in other words, there
exists a centralized decision maker, the hierarical programming problem becomes a goal
programming problem. However, in most cases, the decision makers at different levels have
their own perspectives and their own separate objectives.
Another model, Analytical Hierarchy Process, is also close to Hierarchical Decision Mak-
ing, in that it also has a hierarchical structure, which is defined as goal, criteria and decision
making units. The major use of Analytical Hierarchy Process is to conduct comparisons,
evaluate and choose among several decision units according to multiple criteria. Priority
weights are assigned to different criteria. With the evaluation of these alternative deci-
sion units on these criteria, the overall scores for the decision units could be calculated
and compared. The applications of AHP involve planning, resource allocation, priority set-
ting, and selection among alternatives. Other application areas include forecasting, total
quality management, business process re-engineering, quality function deployment, and the
Balanced Scorecard. Again, under AHP, there is usually one decision maker. Even in the
presence of multiple stakeholders, the AHP framework seeks to reconcile their responses
to be consistent. Also, the choices being compared in an AHP framework are only dis-
crete; whereas continuous decisions variables, such as price can be included in hierarchical
programming models.
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2. Literature Review
In this chapter, we start with a review of the literature on solution methods for hier-
archical decision making. Then, we put emphasis on applications of hierarchical decision
making. Finally, the chapter is concluded with a summary to indicate the motivation of this
study.
2.1 Solution Methods for Continuous Bilevel Programming Problems
In this section, we review the features and the development of methodologies in the area
of BP. Our focus is on continuous BPs for now and postpone the discussion of DBPs. We
categorize the methods into two groups: vertex-enumeration based algorithms and gradient
based algorithms.
Vertex-enumeration based algorithms require solving the lower level problem or the re-
laxed problem explicitly to obtain the vertices. By enumerating all vertices, a global solution
can be found. The global solution might not be guaranteed if we only enumerate some of
the vertices. Gradient based algorithms require the evaluation of the first derivatives or
even the second derivatives. Some approximation methods are applied. Furthermore, the
methods in this category rarely can guarantee a global solution. We review all the methods
belonging to these two classes separately in the next two subsections.
2.1.1 Vertex-enumeration Based Algorithm
In this subsection, we summarize the direct enumeration method, the branch-and-bound
method and the complementarity pivoting method. All three methods are based on the
enumeration of all or part of all the possible solutions during optimization. A global optimum
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cannot be guaranteed whenever any solution procedure attempts to devise a system to only
partially enumerate the solution space.
a) Direct Vertex Enumeration
As its name suggests, direct vertex enumeration directly calculates all the vertices of the
feasible region. In this part, we review all the methods which require enumerating some or
all the points to get optimal solutions. This type of method has especially wide use in linear
bilevel programming because one of the significant features of LBPs is that the feasible sets
are polyhedral when all the constraints are linear. The feasible region (1.3.1) is examined.
At least one of the vertices in the region is the optimal solution for the bilevel problem if the
set is nonempty. This method is straightforward, however, computational efforts are highly
affected by the size of the problem, especially with the number of variables in the model.
Papavassilopoulos[59] proposes several algorithms to solve an LBP without constraints
in the upper level:
min
x
F (x, y) = Cxx+ Cyy
s.t. y ∈ argmin
y
{f(x, y) = cyy : s.t. g(x, y) = axx+ ayy − b ≤ 0}.
(2.1.1)
The first algorithm solves the lower level problem with respect to y at a given xk, that
is:
yk = argmin
y
{cyy : s.t. axxk + ayy ≤ b}
, then checks all the neighboring vertices of the current optimal point (xk, yk) to find the
next start point (xk+1, yk+1) if it qualifies with both an improvement in the upper level ob-
jective value and stays in the reaction set. Meanwhile, the objective value of the upper level
problem at this point provides a lower bound, which can be enforced as a new constraint into
the optimization of the subproblem. The best point selected from the neighboring vertices
should be the one that leads to the largest change in the objective function or the one that
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lies on the edge as close as the coefficient of the upper level problem. The algorithm con-
tinues until all the vertices have been examined. The best point giving the smallest upper
level objective value is a global optimal solution to the original bilevel problem.
The second method presented in [59] separates all the constraint sets into different subsets
according to the binding properties. Combined with the KKT condition of the lower level
problem, the new problem is:
min
x,y,λ
F (x, y) = Cxx+ Cyy
s.t. cy + aTy λ = 0
axx+ ayy ≤ b
λT (axx+ ayy − b) = 0
λ ≥ 0.
(2.1.2)
Let I = {1, 2, . . .m2} define the set of all the indices of the constraints, along with Ij1
which denotes jth combination of binding constraints, where j = 1, 2, . . . , 2m2 . A comple-
ment subset Ij2 are also defined. Then the above constraints can be divided into 2 subsets
of constraints in 2m2 ways. The jth such partition of the constraints is listed as follows:
cy +
∑
i∈Ij1
ayiλ
j
i = 0
λT (axx+ ayy − b) = 0
axix+ ayiy = bi, i ∈ Ij1
axix+ ayiy ≤ bi, i ∈ Ij2
λji ≥ 0, i ∈ Ij1
λji = 0, i ∈ Ij2 .
(2.1.3)
A point (xj , yj) that satisfies the above constraints describes one of the vertices in the
reaction set of the original BP. As a result, any feasible point could be written as an affine
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function of the vertices that make a certain subset of the constraints hold, i.e.,
x = µ1x1 + µ2x2 + . . .+ µNxN =
∑
j
µjx
j
y = µ1y1 + µ2y2 + . . .+ µNyN =
∑
j
µjy
j
µ1 + µ2 + . . .+ µN = 1.
The equivalent problem is
min F (x, y) = Cx
∑
j
µjx
j + Cy
∑
j
µjy
j
s.t. µjcy +
∑
i∈Ij1
ayiµjλ
j
i = 0, j = 1, . . . , N
∑
µj = 1.
µj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , N
(2.1.4)
Note that the computational complexity increases with the number of constraints in the
lower level problem.
The third algorithm in [59] starts from solving the upper level problem subject to the
relaxed feasible region Γ (1.3.1), that is
(x¯k, y¯k) ∈ argmin
x,y
{F (x, y) : s.t. axx+ ayy ≤ b} .
Then it gets the optimal solution (x¯k, y˜k) by solving the lower level problem within the lower
level feasible region(1.3.2) at a fixed x = x¯k:
y˜k ∈ argmin
y
{
f(x¯k, y) : s.t. axx¯k + ayy ≤ b
}
.
The algorithm checks whether the solution satisfies y˜k = y¯k. If so, (x¯k, y¯k) is the optimal
solution. Otherwise, we find the next vertex (x¯k+1, y¯k+1) within the reaction set until no
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better upper objective value can be found.
Among the three algorithms, if the solution is already around the global solution, the
third algorithm will outperform the others. But if only a good guess of xk exists, the first
one is better. As to the second one, [59] suggests combining it with the first algorithm to
find the optimal solution fast.
Bialas and Karwan[16, 17] introduce the“K-th best” algorithm method, which is quite
close to the last method mentioned in [59]. Take the same steps to get (x¯k, y¯k) and (x¯k, y˜k).
If y˜k = y¯k, the solution is the global solution to the original problem. If not, search the ad-
jacent extreme points in the neighbourhood of (x¯k, y˜k) to get the relative smallest objective
value in the upper level, which is expected to be larger than that for (x¯k, y˜k). Then this
point is called (x¯k+1, y¯k+1), and the above process is repeated until y˜K = y¯K , which is the
“K-th best”.
Candler and Townsley [25] also focus on (2.1.1) and develop an equivalent problem as:
min
x,y˜
Cxx+ Cy y˜
s.t. axx+ a˜y y˜ − b ≤ 0
(2.1.5)
where a˜y is an optimal basis of ay with nonnegative reduced cost and y˜ is the solution,
with the components corresponding to the columns in a˜y, since the solutions of the equiv-
alent problem are feasible for the original problem. Whenever no degeneracy appears, the
algorithm searches through moving from one optimal basis to another until there is no im-
provement in the objective function.
For a general LBP, Tuy et al.[79] outline the method of polyhedral annexation to get a
global solution. The general LBP can be written as a reverse convex constrained problem:
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min
x∈X
F (x, y) = Cxx+ Cyy
s.t. Axx+Ayy ≤ B
axx+ ayy ≤ b
cyy ≤ ϕ(x),
(2.1.6)
where ϕ(x) is the optimal objective value of the optimized problem, i.e.,
ϕ(x) = min
y
{cyy : axx+ ayy ≤ b, y ≥ 0} ,
and is a convex polyhedral function. The constraint cyy ≤ ϕ(x) is called a reverse convex
constraint. Without considering the last reverse convex constraint, we get the optimal solu-
tion (xk, yk), which denotes one of the polyhedron vertices. If (xk, yk) satisfies the reverse
convex constraint, i.e., cyyk = ϕ(xk), we can conclude that it is the optimal solution. If not,
we rewrite the objective function and constraints in terms of the nonbasic variables. The
method of finding the next vertex from the current vertex is to construct a new polyhedron
by cutting off the current vertex from the previous polyhedron, that is adding a new con-
straint F (x, y) ≤ F (xk, yk) −  while ensuring the new vertex is not included in the region
of cyy ≤ ϕ(x). Whenever the convex region fully contains the polyhedron, the last solution
is the global optimal solution.
b)Branch-and-Bound Method
Falk[36] first applies a branch-and-bound method to solve a linear minmax problem
max
x
min
y
{F (x, y) = Cxx+ Cyy : G(x, y) = Axx+Ayy −B ≤ 0} , (2.1.7)
where both the objective function and the constraints are linear. The basic idea is to solve
two subproblems iteratively in each stage, where the first subproblem
18
F¯ k = max
x,y
{F (x, y) = Cxx+ Cyy : Axx+Ayy −B ≤ 0} (2.1.8)
provides an upper bound for F at the solution (xk, yk), and the second subproblem
F k = min
y
{
F (xk, y) = Cxxk + Cyy : Axxk +Ayy −B ≤ 0
}
(2.1.9)
yields a lower bound for F . If F¯ k = F k, then (xk, yk) is the optimal solution to the original
BP. Otherwise, we construct stage (k + 1) by branching on each basic variable xkj , where
j is in the index set of basic variables Bk, for the first subproblem of stage k. Each child
node has the form
max
x,y
{
F (x, y) = Cxx+ Cyy : Axx+Ayy −B ≤ 0, xkj = 0,
}
(2.1.10)
for some j, that is, the basic variable xkj is now required to be nonbasic. The process con-
tinues recurrsively until a solution is found.
In addition, [36] also considers constructing subproblems using the complementarity con-
ditions of the problem (1.3.9). The search tree is developed based on this condition. In fact,
most branch-and-bound methods used in BP rely on this idea, which is formally presented
in [7] and [9]. The branching scheme pertains to locating the segment in the inducible region
of the BP problem.
In [7], Bard discusses a convex BP with multiple followers in the lower level. For the
generalized model (1.2.1), the objective function F (x, y) and the constraints G(x, y) are
convex in all their arguments. A point in the inducible region is defined by the solution
(x0, y0) of the relaxed combined problem:
min
x,y
{F (x, y) : x ∈ X,∇yf(x, y) + λ∇yg(x, y) = 0, g(x, y) ≤ 0, λ ≥ 0} ,
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which provides a lower bound F = F (x0, y0). The relaxation is obtained by omitting the
complementarity constraints from (1.3.9). As before, the solution to the lower level problem
min
y
{
f(xk, y) : g(xk, y) ≤ 0}
is obtained by (xk, y¯k). F (xk, y¯k) = F implies that it is the optimal solution to the original
problem. Otherwise, we branch on constraint gi(x, y), which is selected by
argmin
i
{ −∇F (xk, yk)T∇gi(xk, yk)
||∇F (xk, yk)|| · ||∇g(xk, yk)||
}
.
The upper bound is updated by solving the resulting child problem:
min
x,y
{F (x, y) : x ∈ X,∇yf(x, y) + λ∇yg(x, y) = 0, g(x, y) ≤ 0 and gi(x, y) = 0} (2.1.11)
If the objective value is greater than the current upper bound, the branch would be
fathomed. Next, the ongoing path is determined by the assignment of all the remaining
constraints into the following subsets:
S1 = {i : undetermined}
S2 = {i : gi(x, y) = 0, i /∈ S1}
S3 = {i : λi = 0, i /∈ S1} .
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With the new path, a new upper bound is attained at the solution of the following problem:
min
x,y
F (x, y)
x ∈ X,
∇yf(x, y) + λT∇yg(x, y) = 0,
gi(x, y) = 0, i ∈ S2,
λi = 0, i ∈ S3.
(2.1.12)
Optimality is reached if this bound equals F . While this is a branch-and-bound method,
the strategy of identifying the active sets S1, S2, S3 requires significant bookkeeping. In
[34], Edmunds and Bard devise strategies to efficiently implement this method.
A Branch-and-Bound method and an active set strategy are also applied to solve the
bilevel problem with a linear upper level problem and a quadratic lower level problem in [9].
Since the single problem converted by substituting the KKT conditions of the lower level
problem into the upper level problem is a linear problem with complementarity constraints,
the globally optimal solution can be guaranteed. The basic idea is similar to that described
above for [7], and the node to be branched is the one with the largest complementarity
product λigi(xk, yk).
[40] presents a way to apply a branch-and-bound method to LBPs of the form (1.2.2)
and (1.2.3). The discussion still focuses on the tightness of constraints in the lower level
problem, and new binary variables η are introduced to represent whether the constraints are
tight:
ηi :

0 if gi(x, y) < 0
1 if gi(x, y) = 0
(2.1.13)
for i = {1 . . .m2},
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ηm2+j :

0 if yj < 0
1 if yj = 0
(2.1.14)
for j = {1 . . . n}. [40] further shows the following certain logical relationship about ηi holds:
if (cy)j > 0 ,
∑
i|aij>0
ηi ≥ 1
if (cy)j < 0,
∑
i|aij<0
ηi + ηm2+j ≥ 1
then a new branch-and-bound method based on the value of ηi is applied to get the optimal
solution in a linear case. With a determined ηi or a subset of η, according to the binding
constraints, some y in the lower level could be expressed by the other (x, y) values. It results
in the subproblems with all the parameters updated correspondingly:
min
x
F˜ (x, y˜) = C˜xx+ C˜y y˜
G˜(x, y˜) = A˜xx+ A˜y y˜ − B˜ ≤ 0
(2.1.15)
y˜ ∈ argmin
y˜′
{f˜(x, y˜′) = c˜xx+ c˜y y˜′ : g˜(x, y˜′) = a˜xx+ a˜y y˜′ − b˜ ≤ 0}. (2.1.16)
At every node, the algorithm needs to solve three subproblems: (1) the problem (2.1.15)
with all the constraints from (2.1.16) to get the solution (x¯, y¯) (2) The problem (2.1.16) to
get the solution (x¯, y˜). (3) the original lower level problem at the given x¯ to get (x¯, y˜o). In
each branch-and-bound process, we not only make sure that the solutions are rational by
checking y¯ = y˜ and y¯ = y˜o, but also make sure that there is enough improvement in the
objective function of the upper level problem.
The disjunctive nature of the complementarity slackness conditions is captured by Fortuny-
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Amat and McCarl[39]. When solving a quadratic bilevel problem:
min
x
F (x, y) = Cxx+ Cyy + (x, y)TP (x, y)
G(x, y) = Axx+Ayy −B ≤ 0
y ∈ argmin
y′
{f(x, y′) = cyy′ + (x, y′)TP (x, y′) : g(x, y′) = axx+ ayy′ − b ≤ 0}.
(2.1.17)
They add zero-one vectors η1 and η2 and reformulate (2.1.17) in a single problem as follows:
min
x,y,η1,η2
F (x, y)
s.t. G(x, y) ≤ 0
g(x, y) + s1 = 0
Ly(x, y) + s2 = 0
s1 ≤Mη1
λ ≤M(e− η1)
y ≤Mη2
s2 ≤M(e− η2)
η1, η2 ∈ {0, 1} ,
(2.1.18)
where M is a large positive parameter. Branch-and-bound can be employed to solve this
mixed integer problem and the global optimum can be guaranteed.
Al-Khayyal[3] applied a branch-and-bound algorithm to the bilevel problem with a con-
cave objective function and quadratic constraints in the lower level. Upper bounds and
lower bounds are obtained through rectangular partitions, which confine arguments to small
intervals, corresponding to upper bounds and lower bounds for the objective function. The
complementarity condition λigi(x, y) = 0 is rewritten as
0 =
∑
i
λigi(x, y) =
∑
i
[λi −max {0, λi + gi(x, y)}] ,
then converted to the quadratic form:
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0 =
∑
i
[
λ2i − zi
]
,where zi ≥ [max {0, λi + gi(x, y)}]2 .
The upper level objective function is replaced by F (x, y)+
∑
i zi. The lower level constraint
functions g have a quadratic form and by defining x in certain regions such asmk ≤ xk ≤ mk,
we can divide the whole feasible region into several rectangular intervals, which provide the
upper bounds and lower bounds for the upper level objective functions.
The algorithm is further extended by Jaumard et al.[42] to the situation with convex
objective functions in both levels, quadratic upper level constraints and affine lower level
constraints.
c)Parametric Complementarity Pivot Algorithm
The sequential linear complementarity problems(SLCP) method is a type of parametric
complementarity pivot(PCP) algorithm. It was introduced by Bialas and Karwan [17] as
a continuation of the work in [15]. The basic idea is presented in the following. After
combining the upper level problem with the KKT conditions of the lower level and adding
slack variables, a standard LBP can be rewritten as :
min Cxx+ Cyy
subject to −s1 = −b+ ayy + axx
−s2 = cy − axλ
λT s1 = yT s2 = 0
x, y, λ, s1, s2 ≥ 0.
(2.1.19)
A parameter κ is introduced to change the objective function to a constraint and the
problem into a linear complementarity problem:
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min κ
subject to −s1 = −b+ ayy + axx
−s2 = cy − axλ
λT s1 = yT s2 = 0
κ ≥ Cxx+ Cyy
x, y, λ, s1, s2 ≥ 0.
(2.1.20)
Instead of solving a nonconvex nonlinear problem, we solve the parametric LCP(κ):

−s1
−s2
s3
 =

−b
cy
0
+

0
0
1
κ+

0 ay a1
−aTy 0 0
0 −Cy −Cx


λ
x
y
 . (2.1.21)
In the kth iteration, κk is defined by
κk = Cxxk−1 + Cyxk−1 − γ|Cxxk−1 + Cyxk−1|,
where γ is a small positive constant and (xk−1, yk−1) is the optimal solution in the (k−1)th
LCP corresponding to κk−1. The global solution is claimed to be found if LCP(κk) has no
solution. Correspondingly, the solution (x, y) associated with κk−1 is the optimal solution.
2.1.2 Gradient-Based Algorithms
In this section, we will review the literature on solving BPs with gradient-based meth-
ods. We put special emphasis on three methods: direct descent method, trust region method
and penalty method.
For all three, the gradient of the objective function in the upper level with respect to its
decision variables is evaluated by using partial derivatives:
∇xF (x, y(x)) = ∇xF (x, y) +∇yF (x, y)∇xy(x). (2.1.22)
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In some special cases such as the BP without constraints in the lower level, it is not
difficult to calculate the gradient ∇xy(x) by directly differentiating an explicit form of the
function y(x) [33]. However, there exists either complicated constraints or multiple vari-
ables in the lower level problem, and the calculation of partial gradients becomes extremely
difficult.
In [51], Kolstad and Lasdon propose a method to calculate the gradients ∇xy. Distin-
guished by whether the solution is between bounds or at a bound, y(x) is partitioned as yB1,
yN1 respectively. Binding constraints and nonbinding constraints are denoted by gB2 and
gN2. Correspondingly, we have the Lagrange multipliers λB2 and λN2. For any component
of x, say xi, the derivatives satisfy
dyN2/dxi = 0
dλN2/dxi = 0 ∇2yL (∇ygB2)T
(∇ygB2)T 0
 ·
 dyB1/dxi
dλB2/dxi
 = −
 (∇y(∂L/∂xi))T
∂gB2/∂xi
 .
(2.1.23)
This method to calculate the gradients is efficient if the lower level has mostly inactive con-
straints or simple bounds on the variables. Originally, a procedure for computing derivatives
needed to solve a linear system of size n2 +m2. However, this method just requires solving
a linear system of size equal to the sum of the number of active constraints and the number
of between-bounds-variables.
a)Direct Descent Method
With the Lagrangian expression developed in (1.3.10), Savard and Gauvin[67] propose a
steepest descent method to solve the bilevel problem without upper level constraints. For
the optimal solution (x∗, y(x∗)), the following relationship holds:
F (x∗, y(x∗)) = ∇xF (x∗, y(x∗))dx +∇yF (x∗, y(x∗))dy(x∗, dx) ≥ 0, (2.1.24)
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where dy(x∗, dx) is the directional derivative for y, related to both the value of x∗ and
the directional derivative dx. As a result, in order to find the steepest descent direction
d = (dx, dy), the algorithm needs to solve the following linear quadratic bilevel program:
min
dx
∇xF (x, y)dx +∇yF (x, y)dy(x, dx)
s.t. ||dx|| ≤ 1
(2.1.25)
where the value of dy(x, dx) is obtained by solving the quadratic program:
min
dy
(dTx , d
T
y )∇2xyL(x, y, λ)(dx, dy)
s.t. ∇ygB(x, y)dy ≤ −∇xgB(x, y)dx
∇ygNB(x, y)dy = −∇xgNB(x, y)dx
∇yf(x, y)dy ≤ −∇xf(x, y)dx +∇xL(x, y, λ)dx.
(2.1.26)
Using the existing algorithms to solve quadratic bilevel problem [9, 42], dx can be determined
in each iteration. If (2.1.25) provides a positive objective value, a local optimum is reached.
Otherwise, along with the direction dx, the step length  is calculated by
F (x+ dx, y(x+ dx)) ≤ F (x, y(x)).
The algorithm continues from the new startpoint (x+ dx, y(x+ dx)) in the next iteration
until it stops at the local optimal solution. In order to get the global optimal solution, some
global schemes need to be included.
Vicente et al.[85] propose and develop several new terminologies such as extreme induced
region points(EIR points), extreme induced direction(EIR direction) and local star induced
region point(LSIR point). EIR points are obtained by solving the optimization problem of
replacing the lower level problem with its KKT conditions. The EIR direction is defined as
the direction between two EIR points. The LSIR point is an EIR point, at which there ex-
ists an EIR direction pointing to the adjacent EIR point that gives a better objective value.
Thus, the LSIR point cannot be a local optimum. The basic algorithm is described as con-
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structing Dk =
{∇F (zk)T d < 0 and d is an EIR direction} at an EIR point zk = (xk, yk)
in kth iteration. If Dk is a null set, the local optimum is arrived; Otherwise, if a better
objective function can be found by dk ∈ Dk at the adjacent EIR point, the current check
point moves to that point as zk+1; otherwise, zk is an LSIR point.
Vicente et al.[85] go further into the modified steepest descent algorithm by search-
ing the descent direction dk = (dkx, d
k
y) and calculating the exact step size 
k so that
zk+1 = (xk+1, yk+1) = (xk, yk) + k(dkx, d
k
y). The direction d
k = (dkx, d
k
y) can be obtained
by the sequential LCP method[43]. Another hybrid method takes advantages of both of
the above two methods. The algorithm can converge to the local optimum if the objective
function in the upper level is concave. However, a global optimum cannot be guaranteed.
The work that integrates the descent method and a bundle method is done by Falk and
Liu[37]. They propose two methods: leader predominate algorithm and adaptive leader
predominate algorithm. The former uses a bundle method on the upper-level problem and
combined with a trust region method to ensure converge to certain points. The latter in-
corporates a quasi-Newton method into a bundle method in the inner problem. The quasi-
Newton method relies on the second-derivative indicator. The local structure of the current
estimated solution is very helpful in the scheme. Global convergence and local superlinear
convergence to regular points have been proved. Both methods subtract the subgradient
information to compute directional derivatives, however, they are all confined to local solu-
tions instead of global solutions.
b)Trust Region Method
The core of a trust region method is to approximate the original problem H(z) with a
linear or a quadratic function H˜(z), that is considered accurate enough in a neighborhood
of the current point with ||z − z˜|| ≤ r. This neighborhood is referred to as the trust region.
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The effectiveness of the new approximation model is measured by the ratio:
H(z)−H(z˜)
H˜(z)− H˜(z˜) . (2.1.27)
The value of this ratio determines the radius and the step length from the current point
to the next point. It is a measure of how well the approximation represents the original
problem. The next iteration may continue to stay at the current search point or move to a
new point. Additionally, the radius could remain the same, increase, or decrease. All these
changes are determined by the above ratio (2.1.27).
A bilevel program of the form
min
x
F (x, y)
s.t. f(x, y)T (y − y′) ≤ 0, ∀y′ ∈ Γ(x)
(2.1.28)
is considered in Marcotte et al’s work [58]. At the kth iteration based on the current solution
(xk, yk), the algorithm forces x to lie within the distance rk, replacing F and f by their
respective first-order Taylor series expansion F˜ and f˜ to approximate the original problem,
that is
min
x
F˜ (x, y)
s.t. f˜(x, y)T (y − y′) ≤ 0, ∀y′ ∈ Γ(x)
||x− xk|| ≤ rk.
(2.1.29)
As before, the lower level problem is replaced by its KKT conditions with the com-
plementarity condition transferred to a mixed-integer problem. The subproblem in each
iteration is:
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min
x
F˜ (x, y)
s.t. ||x− xk|| ≤ rk
axx+ ayy − b ≤ 0
λay = F˜ (x, y)
λ ≥ 0
λ ≤Mη
axx+ ayy − b ≤M(e− ηT ).
(2.1.30)
The solution to the above problem is (x¯k, y¯k), which can be substituted into (2.1.31) to
get the ratio.
f(xk, y(xk))− f(x¯k, y(x¯k))
f(xk, y(xk))− f(x¯k, y(x¯k)) (2.1.31)
where y(xk) and y(x¯k) are the best reaction of the follower to the choice of xk and x¯k,
respectively.
Colson et al.[29] approximate F , G and g with linear functions F˜ , G˜ and g˜, respectively,
and approximate f with a quadratic model f˜ . That is, the upper level problem becomes
min F˜ (x, y) = F (xk, yk) +∇xF (xk, yk)(x− xk) +∇yF (xk, yk)(y − yk)
s.t. G˜(x, y) = G(xk, yk) +∇xG(xk, yk)(x− xk)
(2.1.32)
and the lower level problem becomes
min f˜(x, y) = f(xk, yk) +∇xf(xk, yk)(x− xk) +∇yf(xk, yk)(y − yk)
+ 12
(
x− xk y − yk
)
D2f(x, y)
x− xk
y − yk

s.t. g˜(x, y) = g(xk, yk) +∇xg(xk, yk)(x− xk) +∇yg(xk, yk)(y − yk).
(2.1.33)
To rewrite the problem as a mixed integer problem incorporating the KKT conditions in the
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lower level problem, the following subproblem yields the solution (x¯k, y¯k) in the iteration k:
F˜ (x, y) = ∇xF (xk, yk)x+∇yF (xk, yk)y
s.t.
∥∥x− xk∥∥ ≤ rk
∇xG(xk)x ≤ G(xk)−∇xG(xk)xk
∇xg(xk, yk)x+∇yg(xk, yk)y ≤ g(xk, yk)−∇xg(xk, yk)xk +∇yg(xk, yk)yk
λ ≥ 0
λ ≤Mη
−g˜(x, y)−∇xg(xk, yk)x−∇yg(xk, yk)y ≤M(e− η)
∇2xyf(xk, yk)(x− xk) +∇2yyf(xk, yk)(y − yk) +∇yf(xk, yk) + λ∇yg(xk, yk) = 0
η ∈ {0, 1} .
(2.1.34)
When we fix x¯k and solve the lower level problem, we can get that the optimal reaction
from the follower is y(x¯k). The ratio of achieved versus predicted reduction is
F (xk, y(xk))− F (x¯k, y(x¯k))
F˜ (xk, yk)− F˜ (x¯k, y¯k) ,
and the algorithm will continue the search from the new start point (x¯k, y(x¯k)) or stay at
the same point (xk, yk) searching with a smaller step length.
Trust region methods are designed for single-level nonlinear programming problems and
cannot be stand-alone methods to solve a BP. They are usually used to solve BP after
a certain reformulation on the problem. The above two papers both implement the trust
region method after combining the KKT conditions of the lower level with the upper level
problem and incorporating the mixed integer method from [39]. It is also possible to apply a
penalty method with the trust region method implemented to accelerate the computational
performance[26].
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c)Penalty Approach
Due to the nonconvexity of the lower level problem, it can guarantee neither continuity
nor differentiability at every point. In order to smooth the lower level objective function, a
penalty method can be employed. A penalty approach adds a penalty term to the original
objective function so that the new objective function is smoothed and can be solved easily.
If the lower level problem is linear, the duality gap is zero when it reaches optimality.
It is not difficult for the leader to anticipate the reaction of the follower during its decision-
making if it can directly penalize the duality gap of the follower’s problem in its objective
function. Two assumptions are required to take this penalty approach.
1. If x∗ is an optimal solution for the leader, then the reaction set for this x∗ is a singleton.
2. The feasible region for λ and for x are non-empty bounded polyhedral, i.e. polytope.
It can be proved that with these assumptions, lower level optimality can be reached by in-
creasing penalty parameter monotonically. The method is first introduced by Anandalingam
and White [5] to get a global optimal solution in a linear static Stackelberg game:
min
x
F (x, y) = Cxx+ Cyy
s.t. G(x, y) = Axx+Ayy −B ≤ 0
y ∈ argmin
y′
{f(x, y′) = cxx+ cyy′ : g(x, y′) = axx+ ayy′ − b ≤ 0}.
(2.1.35)
For any given x, axx and cxx become constants. The dual problem for the lower level
problem can be expressed as:
min
λ≥0
λT (b− ayy)
s.t. λTay ≥ cy.
(2.1.36)
If the duality gap Φ(y, λ) =
[
cyy − λT (b− axx)
]
is treated as a penalty term and appended
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into the upper level problem with a penalty parameter t, then the new problem is:
max
x,y,λ
F˜ (x, y, λ, t) = (Cxx+ Cyy)− t · Φ(y, λ)
s.t. Axx+Ayy −B ≥ 0
axx+ ayy − b ≥ 0
λTay ≥ cy
x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0.
(2.1.37)
Therefore, the original bilevel problem transfers to a single problem, which can be solved
easily. Later on, White and Anandalingam[88] further extend their work by using a sequen-
tial t generation and cone splitting algorithm to find the global optimum under the same
framework of penalizing the dual-gap. The cone splitting algorithm generates a better cone
in the current local optimal solution so that the size of the feasible region under examination
is reduced. They also study a way to find starting points not only for the penalty algorithm
but for other algorithms such as the branch and bound method. However, the effectiveness
depends on the correlation between the objectives. The penalty method does not always
outperform the branch-and-bound method in the linear case although it is much better than
the K-th best method according to their numerical results.
Another main penalty approach that has been used in BP is the barrier method. The
barrier method is also called the interior penalty method, which constructs a barrier function
appropriately defined on the interior of the feasible region. Therefore, the method trans-
forms the parametric constrained optimization problem for the lower level/ the combined
problem in BP into an unconstrained problem.
Aiyoshi and Shimizu [1] propose a barrier penalty method based on the lower level feasible
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region. The penalty function Φ(g(x, y))is defined as
Φ(g(x, y))

> 0 if y ∈ INTΓ(x)
→∞ if y → BDΓ(x).
(2.1.38)
The augmented lower level problem is represented by:
min
y
f˜(x, y) = f(x, y) + tkΦ(g(x, y)), tk > 0. (2.1.39)
With the assumptions mentioned, the KKT conditions for the lower level problem are
combined with the upper level problem to get a single problem:
min
x,y
F (x, y)
s.t. G(x, y) ≤ 0
∇y f˜(x, y) = 0.
(2.1.40)
Under the convexity assumption, it can be shown that there exists a strictly decreasing
sequence
{
tk
} → 0 for which the solution to (2.1.40) is the same as the original problem.
The same method can be applied to solve a Min-Max problem [70].
The method in [2] not only considers constructing an interior barrier function Φ(g(x, y))
of (2.1.38) for the lower-level problem but also Φ2(G(x, y)) for the upper level problem
defined as:
Φ2(G(x, y))

> 0 if (x, y) ∈ INTΓ
→∞ if (x, y)→ BDΓ.
(2.1.41)
It also constructs an exterior barrier function Φ1(||∇y f˜(x, y, t)||) based on the follower’s
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first-order optimality condition:
Φ1(||∇y f˜(x, y, t)||)

= 0 if (x, y) ∈
{
(x, y) ∈
⋃
x∈RN
x× INTΓ(x)|∇y f˜(x, y, t) = 0
}
> 0 if (x, y) ∈
{
(x, y) ∈
⋃
x∈RN
x× INTΓ(x)|∇y f˜(x, y, t) 6= 0
}
.
(2.1.42)
Then, the bilevel problem converts to a single level problem without constraints:
min
x,y
F˜ (x, y, t, t1, t2) = F (y, x)+ tΦ(g(x, y))+ t1Φ1(||∇y f˜(x, y, t)||)+ t2Φ2(G(x, y)). (2.1.43)
Here t, t1 and t2 ≥ 0 are the penalty parameters. This penalty method effectively avoids
the difficulty of dealing with the complementarity slackness conditions which arise when
replacing the follower’s problem with the corresponding optimality conditions. The only
concern is ill-conditioning, which may be avoidable by using different initial points.
A double penalty method where both in the upper and lower level objective functions are
penalized also can be applied to the NBP problem. Loridan and Morgan[55] first propose a
double penalty function method for the BP with non-singleton reaction sets with pessimistic
concerns. Instead, Ishizuka and Aiyoshi[41] prove that the method can be easily implemented
for optimistic NBP. The basic principle is the same in both cases. They define the lower
level constraints for (x, y) as
S1 = {(x, y) : x ∈ X,Y ∈ Y, g(x, y) ≤ 0} ,
and the upper level constraints combined with the optimal reaction of the lower level variable
define IR as S2:
S2 = {(x, y) : x ∈ X,Y ∈ <(x), g(x, y) ≤ 0, G(x, y) ≤ 0} .
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Then the nonnegative valued continuous penalty functions are:
Φi(x, y)

= 0 if (x, y) ∈ Si, i = 1, 2
> 0 otherwise.
(2.1.44)
The algorithm also constructs a penalty function defined on the lower level feasible region:
Φ0(x, y)

= 0 if y ∈ INTΓ(x)
→ +∞ if y → BDΓ(x).
(2.1.45)
With a positive penalty parameter, the augmented objective function for the lower level
problem is
f˜(x, y; t) = f(x, y) + tΦ2(x, y) +
1
t
Φ0(y).
Additionally, an exterior penalty function for the upper level problem is constructed as:
F˜ (x, y; t) = F (x, y) + tΦ2(x, y) + tΦ1(x, y).
For each t, the approximate BP problem is formulated as:
min
x,y
F˜ (x, y; t)
s.t. x ∈ X,
y ∈ argmin
y′
f˜(x, y′; t),
(2.1.46)
The algorithm is similar to the one in [2].
Another penalty method is proposed by Shimizu and Lu in [72]. The optimal-value
function of the lower level on the feasible region Γ(x) = {y : g(x, y) ≤ 0, y ∈ Y } is
f¯(x) = f(x, y∗) = min
y∈Γ(x)
f(x, y).
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We set κ1 as an upper bound for the lower level problem and get an equivalent problem
with y replaced by an upper level decision variable y˜:
min
x,y˜,κ1
F (x, y˜)
s.t. G(x, y˜) ≤ 0
g(x, y˜) ≤ 0
f(x, y˜)− κ1 = 0
f¯(x)− κ1 = 0.
(2.1.47)
The exterior penalty method is applied:
min
x,y˜,κ1
F (x, y˜)− t(f(x, y˜) + h(x)− 2κ1)
s.t. G(x, y˜) ≤ 0
g(x, y˜) ≤ 0
f(x, y˜)− κ1 ≤ 0
f¯(x)− κ1 ≤ 0.
(2.1.48)
By adding another artificial variable κ2, (2.1.48) can be reformulated as
min
x,y˜,κ1,κ2
κ2 − t [f(x, y˜) + h(x)− 2κ1]
s.t. F (x, y˜)− κ2 ≤ 0
G(x, y˜) ≤ 0
g(x, y˜) ≤ 0
f(x, y˜)− κ1 ≤ 0
f¯(x)− κ1 ≤ 0,
(2.1.49)
then solving (2.1.49) is equivalent to solving the original problem.
All of the above penalty methods are used for solving NBP. For large enough values of
the penalty parameters, the methods attain local optima if the penalty function is convex
and might get global solution.
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2.1.3 Discrete Bilevel Problem Algorithm
Due to the difficulty of dealing with discrete variables, the amount of literature in the
area of the mixed-integer bilevel problem is quite limited. Most discussions focus on the
linear case and few exist in nonlinear cases with favorable problem structures.
To solve a BLP which has binary decision variables in both levels, Bard and Moore[10]
use the previously discussed methodology of [7] and combine an active set method and a
branch-and-bound method. The original bilevel problem is
min
x∈{0,1}
F (x, y) = Cxx+ Cyy (2.1.50)
with the lower level problem as:
min
y∈{0,1}
f(y) = cyy
s.t. axx+ ayy ≤ b.
(2.1.51)
They reformulate and repeat solving the following subproblem with parametric constraints
min
(x,y)∈{0,1}
f(y) = cyy
s.t. axx+ ayy ≤ b
F (x, y) = Cxx+ Cyy ≤ κ
n1∑
j=1
xj ≥ l.
(2.1.52)
The parameter κ is an upper bound for the objective function of the upper level prob-
lem, which is similar to a cut added to enforce a satisfactory result for the leader. Another
right-hand-side parameter l restricts the number of x variables being set as 1, which offers
a good rule to branch. The value of both variables get updated in each iteration. This
subproblem means to find good points in the follower’s rational reaction region according to
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a specific active set for the leader. The depth-first branch-and-bound and active set method
are identical to those in [7].
Edmund and Bard [35] further develop a branch-and-bound method for a class of BLP
with a discrete upper level problem and a convex nonlinear lower level problem. As in
[34], they replace the lower level problem with its KKT conditions and integrate with the
upper level problem to get a mixed-integer nonlinear single problem. Then they relax the
problem by eliminating the complementarity slackness conditions and replacing the integer
conditions with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Based on the solution of the relaxed problem, they conduct a
branch-and-bound search tree by finding the live node with the maximum complementarity
or integrality violation. They also point out the potential of applying this method to solve
DBP with a discrete lower level problem.
[45] and [44] model the gas shipper problem on a mixed integer bilevel problem. Then
they solve the problem with a penalty function. Dempe and Kalashnikov [31] solve a mixed
integer bilevel problem with integer variables located in the lower level problem by mov-
ing the integer variables to the upper level problem. Recent work [66] by Saharidis and
Lerapetritou is based on Benders decomposition and solves a mixed integer BLP. In each
iteration, a master problem and a subproblem are generated. The master problem relaxes
the original problem by removing integer variables while the subproblem provides bounds
given fixed values for some variables in the master problem. The master problem in the
next iteration uses additional cuts produced according to Lagrangian information from the
current subproblem.
2.2 Applications of Hierarchical Decision Making
The economic interpretation underlying hierarchical decision making implies that the
upper level sends a signal to the lower level by setting up the price or allocating limited re-
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sources so that the lower level can adjust its strategy. Since the upper level problem usually
has more power in the game system, government or other dominant players make decisions
first. Instead, some subordinate sectors and other dominated players respond sequentially.
Therefore, we mention the following applications with emphasis on the supply chain appli-
cations.
2.2.1 Agriculture Problems
Candeler and Norton [24] mention the model regarding the regulation of milk by the
government in the Netherlands. Government decides a milk subsidy and duties on import in
the upper level problem to maximize the overall benefits from the perspective of consumer,
government and farms. The lower level problem deals with the revenue of the monopoly for
producing milk, butter and cheeses from the perspective of farmers.
In [23], policies of Mexican agriculture are suggested to be examined such as subsidies
on fertilizer use, subsidies on irrigation investment loans, support prices on wheat and corn
and water taxes, as well, in an upper level problem of bilevel problem. Correspondingly,
the outputs regarding employment, farm income, corn/wheat production and governmental
expenses could be set to be optimized in the upper level problem. The response of Mexican
agriculture is modeled in the lower level problem. Specifically, Candler et al. illustrate with
an example of an irrigation problem concerned with water policy.
Fortuny-Amat and McCarl [39] discuss the case where the farmers can make decisions
on fertilizer use in the lower level problem. The alternative combinations include whether
or not fertilizer application equipment is loaned with the fertilizer, whether or not prices
use FOB at the fertilizer plant or delivered to the farm. The fertilizer supplier decides the
product price and production variations in the upper level problem.
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Bard [8] first proposes a biofuel model as a bilevel problem. However, he does not consider
any integer variables, which plays a key role in decision making for farms and government.
2.2.2 Resource Allocation Problems
This type of application problem addresses the issue of allocating limited resources to
different uses to create maximum benefit. However, since various decision makers at dif-
ferent levels control various resources and have different profits, the objectives cannot be
accumulated together directly and bilevel models are applied.
Bracken and McGill [19] first summarize several applications of bilevel problems in mili-
tary applications: strategic offense or defense force structure optimization, strategic bomber
force structure and basing optimization, optimization of weapon mix and targeting for attri-
tion processes, strategic defense optimization to achieve post-attrack production capabilities
and optimization of aircraft deployment and sortie allocation. The lower and upper level
problems are assignment problems of resources for defensive and the offensive decision mak-
ers and minimizing the cost of the force, seperately, to satisfy their individual targets. Their
work is extended by [22].
Bracken and McGill [20] also introduce the application of bilevel problems to balance the
conflict of resouces needed for production and marketing. They illustrate with an example
in the airline industry.
Anandalingam and Apprey [4] propose a model to deal with water conflicts in India and
Bangladesh. Recent work by Smith et al. [73] points to renewed interest in this area for a
new product development application.
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2.2.3 Pricing Problems
Cote et al. [30] model price and fare optimization in the airline industry with a bilevel
model. In the upper level problem, the leader airline decides the fare vector. At the lower
level, passengers respond by choosing among different airline companies(the leader or the
leader’s competitor), different classes and different flows to minimize their costs.
2.2.4 Transportation Problems
BP appears frequently in network design problems. One typical problem is the toll set-
ting problem, where the leader is the manager(the owner) of a highway, who plans the toll
setting to maximize his profits. The travellers(the users of the hightway) decide their usage
of the highway to minimize their costs, which consist of time cost, gas cost and toll fees ([57],
[12],[13] and [53]). Ben-Ayed et al. [12, 13] discuss Tunisia’s inter-regional highway by using
a bilevel linear model, which is the first application of bilevel problem in transportation
design systems. [53] proposes a model for a single product, and the model is extended to
multiple commodities[21].
Dempe and Kalashnikov[31, 45, 44] present a discrete bilevel model to compute a cash-
out penalty when the supply and the demand are not equal for a natural gas shipping
company.
2.3 Literature Review for HDM Problems in Closed-loop Supply Chains
Fleischmann et al. [38], Guide et al. [27], Rubio et al. [65] and Pokharel and Mutha
[60] provide thorough surveys of existing research involving remanufacturing. A significant
portion of the work on product recovery addresses inventory control and related matters.
In one of the earliest such works, Schrady [68] presents a deterministic model for repairable
items and derives EOQ type fixed lot sizes for recovery and reorder. Richter [62, 63] studies
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a similar scenario and develops a different control approach utilizing the relationships be-
tween control parameters and the return rate. Schrady’s model is extended to the multiple
items case by Mabini et al., who suggests numerical solution methods. More recently, Koh
et al. [50] propose a deterministic recovery model with a fixed return rate deriving optimal
policies under limited remanufacturing capacity, and Tang and Teunter [77] have embel-
lished the economic lot scheduling problem via the incorporation of returns. As opposed to
these deterministic approaches, stochastic recovery models have also received a substantial
amount of research attention. Cohen et al. [28] study the case where a fixed proportion of
returns are received after the passage of a fixed amount of time, treating recoverable and
serviceable inventories in an identical manner. Their work has been extended by Kelle and
Silver [47, 46], who outline a purchasing policy under random returns. More recently, van
der Laan et al. [81, 82] present a general model for remanufacturing and disposal involving
four control parameters, leading to approximations for deriving the average cost of an (s,
Q) type inventory model for remanufacturing. Subsequently, the differences between dis-
counted cash flow vs. average cost based remanufacturing models have been examined in
detail (Teunter and van der Laan, 2002 [76]; van der Laan, 1996 [83]; van der Laan et al.,
2003 [80]). In conjunction with remanufacturing, issues concerning product disposal have
also received a significant amount of research attention, although this is not a major con-
cern here. Amongst other works, various types of remanufacturing systems with PUSH and
PULL types of disposal strategies have been studied [48, 56].
The major thrust of the extant remanufacturing literature is on the timing and siz-
ing decisions for manufacturing and remanufacturing activities, with primary attention on
inventory related matters. Efforts towards integrating the decisions of inventory replenish-
ment, product pricing and customer incentive for returning used items (in the form of a cash
refund or a discount coupon) in a remanufacturing environment have been relatively rare.
As a notable exception, in a recent study Savaskan et al. [69] have dealt with the questions
of pricing and return incentives from a game theoretic perspective, in examining alternative
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reverse logistics structures for the collection of recoverable products. Bhattacharya et al.
[14] conduct the integration of optimal order quantities in different channels, reflecting the
various relationships among retailer, manufacturer and remanufacturer. Also, Vorasayan
and Ryan [86] outline procedures for deriving the pricing and quantity decisions for refur-
bished products.
Inventory control decisions, which are intertwined with such questions, however, have
been only superficially treated in the pricing related research. This study is an attempt to
address this deficiency in the current body of work involving remanufacturing. We address
some of the major issues concerning inventories, pricing, used product collection, materi-
als procurement, product delivery and planning for manufacturing and remanufacturing in
an integrated manner. Specifically, we develop procedures for developing such integrated
policies towards achieving a well-coordinated supply chain, incorporating a lean production
process. Our emphasis is on the mathematical modeling of product remanufacturing under
a scenario involving a single retailer and a single manufacturer, dealing with a single re-
coverable product. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the models developed here attempt
to establish an integrated policy, simultaneously specifying decisions concerning inventory
replenishment at various stages of the supply chain, retail pricing, as well as the appropri-
ate incentive level for inducing customer returns of used items, from the perspectives of,
maximizing the profits of, respectively, the retailer, the manufacturer and the entire supply
chain. For simplicity of analysis and implementation, we assume a deterministic environ-
ment. Furthermore, the product’s demand and return rates are modeled as simple linear
functions.
2.4 Literature Review for HDM Problems in Biofuel Supply Chains
The majority of the biofuel literature focuses on the political decisions and economic cost
and benefit analysis of biofuel production according to the practice in different countries.
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Rozakis et al. [64] use a partial-equilibrium model to discuss the biofuel cost of chains op-
erating under different policy scenarios in France. The possibilities of biofuel cost reduction
are analyzed. Monte Carlo simulation is implemented to deal with uncertainty, and minimal
tax exemption levels for the viability of the activity are obtained. The study by Kruse et
al. [52] uses a stochastic model to find out the effects of extension of the tax credits and
import tariff on future growth in biofuels. The trade-off between maximizing farm income
and minimizing goverment costs are balanced by setting up the appropriate tax credits and
import tariff. Rajagopal and Zilberman [61] summarize the literature on the biofuel problem
from the perspective of environment, economics and policy-setting.
Regarding the application of bilevel programming to the biofuel problem, the study by
Candler et al. [23] points out the potentials and the difficulties. Bard et al. [11] formulate a
leader-follower game that helps decision makers arrive at a rational policy for encouraging
biofuel production. In this dissertation, we base our work on [11] and incorporate fixed costs
in the farm’s problem to further extend the model. Doing so requires that we include binary
variables in the lower level, which greatly increases the computation complexity. However,
the resulting model is more consistent with the practice. Fixed costs are a significant part
of biofuel production costs, and therefore our models make a very important contribution
to the field by incorporating it into the model. These costs can be related to equipment,
transportation, or other ramp-up costs associated with switching to a new type of crop
and/or harvesting methods.
2.5 Conclusions of Literature Review
Motivated by the real issues in supply chain management, this dissertation studies pric-
ing, lot sizing in remanufacturing and biofuel production with hierarchical decision making
models. In the remanufacturing system we investigate the price setting decision and the
inventory strategy simultaneously. In the cooperative game, the manufacturer and the re-
tailer can work together to avoid side-payment and double-marginalization. The hierarchical
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decision making model becomes a single problem with a multi-objective function if we as-
sume an ideal case with a centralized planner. However, it might not always be the case in
supply chain. According to asymmetrical information acquisition and power distributed in
the different levels, noncooperative games/Stackelberg games are more common. Through
comparing different strategies in different hierarchical decision frameworks, we exploit and
study the decision making and the profits in this closed loop supply chain.
Meanwhile, we also look at the biofuel production model, in which the participants are
the government, the industry and farms. As suppliers, the farms have less power and only
respond to the government’s decision. Thus, we develop models as noncooperative Stack-
elberg games. The government chooses policy decision variables, and the farmers decide
the behavior strategy. Our efforts complement this work by providing a methodology for
solving a mixed integer linear BP. Due to the special structure of the problem, we propose
two methods. The first method is based on a derivative-free search method. Since there are
several “jumps” due to the inclusion of integer variables, it is too difficult for a gradient-
based method to obtain a global optimal solution. However, we still exploit the gradient
techniques locally by applying sensitivity analysis information to speed the computation.
Another method proposed is based on a nonlinear algorithm. We consider a way to calcu-
late the derivative for the objective function in the upper level with respect to the decision
variable belonging to that level. The chain rule is used to incorporate the gradient informa-
tion, which is obtained through solving the lower level problem at any given x directly.
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3. Hierarchical Decision Making Problems in Closed-loop Supply Chains
3.1 Background
Under intense competitive pressure to lower production costs, coupled with increasing
environmental concerns, more and more manufacturers today are focusing on possibilities
of product recovery and reuse. Practices of waste paper and scrap metal recycling, reuse
of containers, and, more recently, recovery of electronic components have given rise to the
notion of environment friendly, or “green” manufacturing. The Xerox Green World Alliance
remanufactured and recycled more than 90%, 25% and 100%, respectively, of remanufac-
tured print cartridges, new toners and plastic parts. This program has led to significant
environmental and financial benefits for Xerox. First, it has prevented 128 million pounds
of waste materials from entering landfills. Secondly, the savings in terms of energy have
been estimated to be 320, 000 megawatt-hours in 2005, due to reuse of parts, in addition to
those resulting from the associated reduction in materials purchasing costs [89].
The efficient incorporation of used products and/or materials considerations into man-
ufacturing processes and supply chain contracts have proven to be important from the
standpoint of “waste free” goals with “sustainable initiatives”. One issue a manufacturer
faces involves the process of collecting the returns. In such a reverse channel structure, our
attention is confined to the case of customer returns at the retail level, which is cited to
be the most effective method for used products collection according to Savaskan et al. [69].
This is a common practice for items such as disposable cameras and mobile phones, where
manufacturers utilize retailers for collecting the used products. For instance, the Eastman
Kodak Company receives returned single-use cameras from large retailers who also develop
film for customers. On the average, 76% of the weight of a disposed camera is reused in the
production of a new one (Savaskan et al., 2004[69]). Generally, retailers are responsible for
providing incentives to customers and finally are reimbursed by the manufacturer to ensure
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that end-of-life products are returned for remanufacture in a timely manner. The various
pricing decisions made in this context significantly affect the profitability of both stages of
the supply chain.
Another concern for the manufacturer, as well as the retailer pertains to inventory issues.
Economies of scale may dictate that manufacturers collect and take back returns at peri-
odic intervals, requiring retailers to have storage space for holding the products returned by
customers. By the same token, manufacturers also need to allocate storage space for such
items. Needless to say that a product’s retail price, customer incentive for returns (both
determined by the retailer), as well as the transfer price paid by the producer to the retailer
for collecting returns are likely to shape the inventory policies for returned items at both
the retailer’s and the manufacturer’s ends. This study is an attempt to examine these issues
from an integrated supply chain perspective.
3.2 Assumptions
The supply chain under study consists of a single retailer and a single manufacturer in-
volved in the production and sale of a single recoverable product. Customers are refunded a
part of the purchase price by the retailer as an incentive to return used products, which can
be restored to “as new” condition for resale through a remanufacturing process deployed by
the manufacturer. The manufacturing/remanufacturing environment is a batch production
system where each batch of the product may consist of a mix of remanufactured and new
manufactured items within a single setup. The used items, after cleaning, restoration, etc.
are completely reincorporated in the existing production process, so that remanufacturing
and new product manufacturing rates are the same, although their variable costs may differ.
For coordination purposes, the lot-for-lot policy is in effect for input materials ordering,
manufacturing and remanufacturing, product delivery and retail inventory replenishment,
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with a common cycle time of T . In other words, the necessary input materials procurement,
production (including remanufacture), delivery and retail stock replenishment cycles are one
and the same. This lot-for-lot feature is commonly found in JIT based lean manufacturing
systems, where minimal levels of material and product inventories are desired.
All input materials for manufacturing or remanufacturing are treated as a composite bun-
dle. In each case, the total bundle of inputs necessary for producing (or remanufacturing) a
unit of the end product is defined as a “unit”. All of the input materials (for manufacturing
and remanufacturing) are ordered on a lot-for-lot basis with a single procurement order prior
to the setup of a batch.
The retailer is responsible for collecting returned items and holding them in inventory
until picked up by the producer. In our decentralized models, the manufacturer pays the
retailer a unit transfer price for the returned items, in order to induce the latter to engage
in the collection activity. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the retailer’s cost of
this collection effort is negligibly small, although the cost of holding the returned products
in inventory at the retail level is taken into account. Under the centralized scenario, the
used product transfer price and the producer’s wholesale price become irrelevant for avoiding
double marginalization. In the decentralized models, the retailer sets the item’s selling price
and the unit reimbursement to customers for returns. The wholesale price, where applicable,
is the same for new or remanufactured items.
We assume that the market demand, the customer return rate and all lead times are
deterministic. Thus, a production batch of Q units consists of Q−X new items and X units
of remanufactured product as shown in Figure (C.1), which depicts the process flow schema
of the supply chain under consideration. Figure (C.2) shows the various inventory-time plots
at the retail and manufacturing facilities. Without loss of generality, these plots are con-
structed with the assumption that the setup and transit times, as well as the cleaning and
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refurbishment times for the recovered items are zero. Before setting up a production batch,
the X units of returned items collected during the cycle are transported back to the plant for
remanufacturing. Therefore, the value of the quantity Q−X is known prior to each setup.
After completion of the manufacturing and remanufacturing process, the replenishment lot
of Q is delivered to the retailer for sale. All transportation costs are paid by the producer.
Consistent with classical microeconomic theory, we model the retail demand rate, d, as
a decreasing function of its selling price, ps, i.e. d = A − Bps. Furthermore, the product’s
return rate, x, and the total units returned, X, during a cycle are expressed, respectively,
as x = arc − bps and X = Tx = Qx/d. The parameters A, B, a, and b are known, or can
be estimated empirically. It is reasonable to assume that the average rate of used product
returns is likely to increase as the return incentive, rc, as well as the overall demand level,
d, increase (or, alternately, as the retail price decreases). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier,
we adopt linear structures for both d and x for simplicity of analysis and implementation.
3.3 Profit Analyses
3.3.1 The Retailer’s Profit
The retailer has two sources of revenue, captured by the first two terms in the below
profit function. The first of these represents the revenue from the sales of new products and
the second term expresses the net revenue, through reimbursements from the manufacturer,
for collecting the used items. The next term represents the average ordering cost and the
remaining two terms show, respectively, the costs of holding new product and returned item
inventories per time unit at the retailer’s end (see Figures (C.2(a) and (b))). Its profit per
time unit can be expressed as
Πr = (ps − pw)d+ (rm − rc)x− Sr d
Q
− hrQ2 − hrr
Qx
2d
. (3.3.1)
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Substituting x = arc− bps and d = A−Bps into (3.3.1), the retailer’s average profit per
time unit can be rewritten as
Πr = (ps− pw)(A−Bps)+ (rm− rc)(arc− bps)−Sr(A−Bps
Q
)− Q
2
[
hr + hrr
(arc − bps)
(A−Bps)
]
.
(3.3.2)
3.3.2 The Manufacturer’s Profit
Thus, in order to develop the manufacturer’s profit function, we need to determine
the average inventories at the manufacturing facility. From Figure (C.2(c)), the average
inventory of the finished product at the manufacturer’s end is
(
Q
2
)(
Q
m
)/(
Q
d
) =
Qd
2m
.
Also, from Figure (C.2(d)) it can be shown that the average inventories of the input
materials necessary for remanufacturing and manufacturing purposes, respectively
x2Q
2md
+
Q
2m
[d− 2x+ x2/d].
Incorporating these results, the profit per time unit for the manufacturer can be expressed
as
Πm =(pw − cs)d− d
Q
(Sm + Srm + Si)− (rm + cr)x
− hmQd
2m
− hirQx
2
2md
− hiQ
2m
(d− 2x+ x
2
d
)− cm(d− x)− crmx.
(3.3.3)
The first term in (3.3.3) shows the manufacturer’s revenue based on the wholesale price,
less the variable shipping cost to the retailer. The second term includes the fixed costs
involving production set up, transportation of new products to and used items from the
retailer and ordering of input raw materials. The third term expresses the reimbursement
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cost to retailer, as well as the variable transportation, cleaning and preparation costs for
the returned items. The next three terms represent the holding costs, respectively, for
the finished product and input materials inventories necessary for remanufacturing and
manufacturing. The final two terms in (3.3.3) are the variable costs per time unit for
manufacturing and remanufacturing, respectively. Substituting for d and x into (3.3.3), and
collecting terms, the manufacturer’s profit per time unit is rewritten as follows:
Πm =(pw − cs − cm)(A−Bps)− A−Bps
Q
(Sm + Srm + Si)
− (rm + cr + crm − cm)(arc − bps)
− Q
2m
[
hm(A−Bps) + hir(arc − bps)
2
(A−Bps)
]
− Q
2m
hi
[
A−Bps − 2(arc − bps) + (arc − bps)
2
A−Bps
]
.
(3.3.4)
3.3.3 The Supply Chain’s Profit
Suppose that the retailer and the manufacturer agree to cooperate towards formulating
a jointly optimal integrated policy for the supply chain as a whole. The focus of such a cen-
tralized policy, where both parties are willing to freely share their cost and other relevant
information, is to maximize the profitability of the entire system, rather than that of either
party. In this centralized approach, we propose that in order to avoid double marginaliza-
tion, the parameters wholesale price pw and manufacturer’s rebate for returned items rm
need not be considered and are omitted. Thus, combining (3.3.1) and (3.3.4), without an
explicit wholesale price and a direct manufacturer’s reimbursement to the retailer for prod-
uct returns, the total supply chain profit is
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Πs =(pw − cs − cm)(A−Bps)− A−Bps
Q
(Sm + Srm + Si + Sr)
− (rc + cr + crm − cm)(arc − bps)
− Q
2m
{
m
[
hr + hrr
arc − bps
A−Bps
]
+ (hir + hi)
[
(arc − bps)2
(A−Bps)
]}
− Q
2m
{(hm + hi)(A−Bps)− 2hi(arc − bps)} .
(3.3.5)
3.4 Development of Hierarchical Decision Making Models and Analysis
3.4.1 Retailer Controlled Model with pw Given
In some industries, due to intense competition, the wholesale price for the manufacturer
is determined by the existing market conditions and is, consequently, treated as a constant
parameter. The exposition in this subsection pertains to such cases.
Suppose that the retailer can set the integrated optimal order quantity and pricing policy
for sales and returns, independent of the manufacturer, with the assumption that it wields
sufficient power as a dominant member of the supply chain. The system is described by the
following model:
max
Q,rc,ps
Πr. (3.4.1)
In such a case, subject to certain assumptions to ensure joint-concavity, the necessary con-
dition for optimality could be applied to calculate the optimal decision from retailer.
The first order optimality conditions are shown below, obtained by setting ∂Πr∂Q ,
∂Πr
∂rc
and
∂Πr
∂ps
, respectively, equal to 0; i.e.
Q =
√
2Sr(A−Bps)
hr + hrr(arc − bps)/(A−Bps) (3.4.2)
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rc =
1
2
[
rm +
b
a
ps − Qhrr2(A−Bps)
]
(3.4.3)
(A−Bps)2[B(pw−2ps)+A−b(rm−rc)+SrB
Q
]−Q
2
hrr[B(arc−bps)−b(A−Bps)] = 0. (3.4.4)
The above conditions (3.4.2), (3.4.3) and (3.4.4) can be solved simultaneously by any
standard equation solving software, in order to obtain Q, rc, and ps . Since the return rate
cannot exceed the demand rate of the item, i.e. d ≥ x, we can then easily show that any
feasible solution must satisfy the requirement: ps ≤ (A− arc)/(B − b). Hence, the roots of
ps in equation (3.4.4) that are negative or violate this feasibility condition are disregarded
in this and subsequent models for computational purposes.
Proposition 3.4.1. Q, rc and ps obtained from (3.4.2), (3.4.3) and (3.4.4) represent the
global optimum if the following conditions are satisfied:
a)
d
Q
≥ ( ah
2
rr
16Sr
)1/3
b)
ah2rr(Ab− aBrc)(Ab− aBrc − bd)
2d4
+
aBhrr[4Sr(Ab− aBrc) +Q2a− 2dbSr]
2Q2d2
+
2aSr(B2Sr − 4BdQ+ b2dQ)
Q4
≤ 0
A proof of the above proposition is provided in the Appendix A.
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3.4.2 Manufacturer Controlled Model with pw Given
If the manufacturer, instead of the retailer, is in a position of dictating supply policy,
it would prefer to implement a production and delivery policy (assuming the lot-for-lot op-
erating framework) that is optimal from its own perspective. In this case, the supplier’s
wholesale price is treated as a given parameter. The retailer, nevertheless, is likely to be
free to set its own selling price and the level of incentive to induce customers to return the
used products, given the manufacturer’s preferred replenishment lot size.
Note that the item’s selling price, ps, and the customer return reimbursement, rc are set
by the retailer. Then the manufacturer’s optimal batch size and the consequent retailer’s
policy variable values are established by the scheme of a sequential game, denoted as:
max
Q
Πm
s.t. (rc, ps) ∈
{
argmax
rc,ps
Πr
} (3.4.5)
which can be solved by combining the optimality conditions (3.4.3) and (3.4.4) resulting
from the retailer’s problem as constraints with the optimality condition with respect to the
order quantity in the upper level problem. The set of equations (3.4.6) shown below
Q =
√√√√ 2m(A−Bps)(Sm + Srm + Si)
hm(A−Bps) + hir(arc−bps)2A−Bps + hi
[
A− (B − 2b)ps − 2arc + (arc−bps)2A−Bps
] (3.4.6)
rc =
1
2
[
rm +
b
a
ps − Qhrr2(A−Bps)
]
(A−Bps)2
[
B(pw − 2ps) +A− b(rm − rc) + SrB
Q
]
−Q
2
hrr [B(arc − bps)− b(A−Bps)] = 0
can be solved simultaneously. Neither the retailer nor the manufacturer would benefit from
any deviation from the optimal solution above, which represents the equilibrium state of the
whole system.
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Proposition 3.4.2. The manufacturer would adopt a remanufacturing strategy only when
the condition:
rm + cr + crm ≤ cm − Q2m
[
hirx
d
+ hi(
x
d
− 2)
]
is satisfied.
(see the Appendix A for proof).
3.4.3 Manufacturer Controlled Model with pw Unknown
Under monopolistic market conditions, manufacturers may lower the wholesale price in
order to encourage retailers to increase their order quantities. As discussed before, under a
decentralized policy, the retailer determines its order quantity as one of the decision variables
along with the selling price and the customer return incentive. It will make these decisions
after the observation of a wholesale price set by the manufacturer. Initially, the manufacturer
would anticipate the optimal response from the retailer when it decides on the wholesale
price, resulting in the following model:
max
pw
Πm
s.t. (rc, ps, Q) ∈
{
argmax
rc,ps,Q
Πr
} (3.4.7)
As before, the optimality condition of the lower level problem (3.4.2)-(3.4.4) could be
combined with the upper level problem as
max
pw
Πm = (pw − cs − cm)(A−Bps)− A−Bps
Q
(Sm + Srm + Si)
− (rm + cr + crm − cm)(arc − bps)
− Q
2m
{
hm(A−Bps) + hir(arc − bps)
2
(A−Bps)
}
− Q
2m
hi
[
A−Bps − 2(arc − bps) + (arc − bps)
2
A−Bps
]
subject to
(3.4.8)
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Q =
√
2Sr(A−Bps)
hr + hrr(arc − bps)/(A−Bps)
rc =
1
2
[
rm +
b
a
ps − Qhrr2(A−Bps)
]
(A−Bps)2[B(pw − 2ps) +A− b(rm − rc) + SrB
Q
]− Q
2
hrr[B(arc − bps)− b(A−Bps)] = 0
If the manufacturer, instead of the retailer, has control of the order quantity, the model
above may be written as a bilevel problem, as shown below:
max
Q,pw
Πm
s.t. (rc, ps) ∈
{
argmax
rc,ps
Πr
}
,
(3.4.9)
which, as before, is the same as:
max
pw,Q
Πm = (pw − cs − cm)(A−Bps)− A−Bps
Q
(Sm + Srm + Si)
− (rm + cr + crm − cm)(arc − bps)
− Q
2m
[
hm(A−Bps) + hir(arc − bps)
2
(A−Bps)
]
− Q
2m
hi
[
A−Bps − 2(arc − bps) + (arc − bps)
2
A−Bps
]
subject to:
(3.4.10)
rc =
1
2
[
rm +
b
a
ps − Qhrr2(A−Bps)
]
(A−Bps)2
[
B(pw − 2ps) +A− b(rm − rc) + SrB
Q
]
−Q
2
hrr [B(arc − bps)− b(A−Bps)] = 0.
This constrained nonlinear problem may be solved by one of several widely available
optimization software packages, such as “fmincon” in MATLAB.
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3.4.4 Centralized Model for Supply Chain Optimality
Suppose that the retailer and the manufacturer agree to cooperate towards formulating a
jointly optimal integrated policy, involving inventory replenishment, retail pricing and cus-
tomer return reimbursement decisions, for the supply chain as a whole. The focus of such a
centralized policy, where both parties are willing to freely share their cost and other relevant
information, is to maximize the profitability of the entire system, rather than that of either
party. We illustrate in the next section that this centralized joint optimization approach
can be economically attractive from the standpoint of both the parties through an equitable
profit sharing methodology. In this centralized approach, we propose that in order to avoid
double marginalization, the parameters wholesale price pw and manufacturer’s rebate for
returned items rm need not be considered and are omitted. With the deduction in (3.3.5),
the first order optimality conditions of the total supply chain profit yield the optimal values
of the replenishment lot size, Q, unit customer reimbursement for returns, rc and the unit
selling price, ps, which maximize the total supply chain profit under the proposed centralized
policy, as shown below:
Q =
√
2m(A−Bps)(Sr + Sm + Srm + Si)
TH
, (3.4.11)
where
TH =m
[
hr + hrr
(arc − bps)
(A−Bps)
]
+ (hir + hi)
[
(arc − bps)2
(A−Bps)
]
+ (hm + hi)(A−Bps)− 2hi(arc − bps)
(3.4.12)
rc =
[(hir + hi)bps + 2hid− hrrm]− 2m(A−Bps)Q (cr + crm − cm − ab ps)
2a(hir + hi) +
4m(A−Bps)
Q
(3.4.13)
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(A−Bps)2
[
A−B(2ps − cm − cs) + b(rc + cr + crm − cm) + B
Q
(Sr + Sm + Srm + Si)
]
− Q
2m
{
(hir + hi)
[
B(arc − bps)2 − 2b(arc − bps)(A−Bps)
]}
− Q
2m
{
hrrm(aBrc − bA)−Bhm(A−Bps)2 + hi(2b−B)(A−Bps)2
}
= 0.
(3.4.14)
Once again, conditions (3.4.11), (3.4.13) and (3.4.14) can be solved via any appropriate
equation solving software, such as fmincon in MATLAB, for determining the centrally con-
trolled inventory replenishment, retail pricing and return reimbursement decisions.
Proposition 3.4.3. Q, rc and ps obtained from solving (3.4.11), (3.4.13) and (3.4.14)
are globally optimal if the following conditions, in addition to conditions (a) and (b) under
Proposition (3.4.1) are satisfied:
(c)
4(Sm + Srm + Si)(db− xB)2(hir − hi)
mQ2d2
−
[
−B(Sm + Srm + Si)
Q2
+
Bhm − hi(2b−B)
2m
+
(2db−Bx)x(hir − hi)
2md2
]2
≥ 0
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(d)
a2B2Q(hir − hi)(hi + hm)2
4m3d
− a
2B2Qxhi(hir − hi)(hi − hm)
m3d2
− a
2BQx2(hir − hi)(Bhirhi − 6bhirhi +Bhirhm − 5Bh2i + 6bh2i −Bhihm)
4m3d3
− a
2B2Qx3hi(hir − hi)2
m3d4
+
a2B2Qx4(hir − hi)3
4m3d5
+
a2B2(hir − hi)(Sm + Srm + Si)2
Q3md
− a
2B2(hir − hi)(hi − hm)(Sm + Srm + Si)
Qm2d
+
2a2B2xhi(hir − hi)(Sm + Srm + Si)
Qm2d2
− a
2B2x2(hir − hi)2(Sm + Srm + Si)
Qm2d3
≤ 0
(see the Appendix A for proof).
3.5 A Numerical Illustration and Discussion
To illustrate our models outlined above, a numerical example is provided below. The
following information pertaining to the two parties in the supply chain are available.
Retailer:
hr = $0.015/unit/day, hrr = $ 0.002/unit/day,
A = 120, B = 3.0
a = 15, b = 0.1
Sr = $50/order.
That is, the daily demand rate is d = 120 − 3ps and the daily return rate is x =
15rc − 0.1ps.
Manufacturer:
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Sm = $300/batch, Srm = $200/batch, Si =$30/batch
hm =$0.01/unit/day, hi =$0.009/unit/day, hir =$0.007/unit/day
cs =$2/unit, cm = $8/unit, crm = $2/unit
cr =$1.20/unit, pw = $20/unit, rm = $2.80/unit
m =100 units/day.
All the results obtained from the various perspectives are summarized in Table (B.1,B.2).
It can be easily verified that the chosen parameters satisfy the joint concavity conditions
(a), (b), (c) and (d). Hence, all the solutions shown in Table (B.1,B.2) are globally optimal.
From this table it is clear that if the retailer has sufficient policy implementation power
in the supply chain, it attempts to keep the replenishment lot size comparatively small (i.e.
428.46 units), in view of its relatively low fixed ordering cost. Furthermore, through its
retail pricing (ps = $30.032/unit), in conjunction with a customer return reimbursement
price of $1.485/unit, it prefers to achieve daily market demand and customer return rates
of 29.904 and 19.391 units, respectively, that attempt to balance the gains from sales and
returns against the ordering and inventory carrying (for both new and used items) costs.
The maximum attainable daily profit for the retailer is, thus, $318.361, resulting in a profit
of $299.918/day for the manufacturer. Note that as every unit of the returned product
represents a net gain of $1.315 (i.e. the difference between the amount, rm, compensated
by the manufacturer and the customer reimbursement, rc) for the retailer, it attempts to
achieve a relatively high used item return rate of about 64%.
If, on the other hand, the manufacturer is in a position to exert a greater level of nego-
tiating power in the supply chain, its individual optimal policy would dictate a significantly
larger replenishment batch of 6083.1 units, due to the relatively high fixed setup and trans-
portation costs. In spite of a more than six-fold increase in the lot size, however, the selling
price and return reimbursement, set by the retailer in response, are both only slightly lower
than their values under its own optimal policy, i.e. $29.90 and $1.40 per unit, respectively.
It is interesting to note that, consequently, the retail demand rate increases slightly to 30.200
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units/day and the average product returns decline slightly to 18.00 units/day. The returns,
however, now decline slightly to 59.6% of sales. Not unexpectedly, implementing the manu-
facturer’s optimal replenishment policy reduces the retailer’s profit to $275.698/day, whereas
the manufacturer’s profit increases to $377.596/day. Nevertheless, in terms of total supply
chain profitability, the difference between adopting any one party’s optimal policy over the
other’s amounts to only about 5.36%.
Table (B.1) and Table (B.2) show that if the retailer and the manufacturer decide to
cooperate through the sharing of necessary information and adopt a jointly optimal policy
that maximizes the total supply chain profit, instead of optimizing either party’s position,
both parties stand to gain considerably from such an approach. As mentioned earlier, the
centralized model attempts to avoid double marginalization, i.e. the manufacturer does
not explicitly charge the retailer a wholesale price, nor does it explicitly offer the latter
a reimbursement for collecting the returns (implying that pw = rm = 0). Without these
cost factors, the centrally controlled approach results in a maximum supply chain profit of
$ 830.78/day, representing a more than 34.4% improvement in total system profitability,
compared to the retailer’s optimal policy, or over 27.2% improvement vis-a-vis the manufac-
turer’s optimal policy. As expected, the jointly optimal replenishment quantity now is 1562.4
units, which is less than the manufacturer’s optimal batch size, but larger than the retailer’s
optimal order quantity. More interestingly, the retail price is reduced to $23.3/unit and the
return reimbursement is decreased to $ 0.5/unit, respectively, resulting in a considerably
larger demand rate of 50.2 units/day, as well as a smaller average product return rate of 5.5
units/day (i.e. about 10.96% of items sold are returned by customers). The implication of
our centralized model is that under a jointly optimal policy, relatively fewer products sold
are remanufactured items. Under the given set of problem parameters, it appears desirable
to increase the overall market demand through a lower retail price. Also, there is a lesser
emphasis on collecting customer returns for remanufacturing. The centralized model reduces
the incentive for customer returns, which maximizes the total supply chain profitability.
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The absence of a wholesale price and an explicit incentive for the retailer to collect re-
turned items raises some interesting questions concerning a fair and equitable sharing of
the total gain resulting from the centralized cooperative policy shown in Table(B.1) and
Table(B.2). Although this can be achieved in several possible ways, we propose a profit
sharing plan under a scenario where the retailer is the more powerful member of the supply
chain and can dictate the implementation of its own optimal policy. The task of the manu-
facturer is then to offer sufficient incentive to the retailer in order for the latter to adopt the
results of this procedure. Note that under its own individual optimal policy, the retailer’s
share is 51.5% of the total profit for both parties. Therefore, it would be reasonable if the
retailer is allocated the same percentage of the total supply chain profit of $ 830.78/day
yielded by the centralized model. In other words, the retailer’s share of the total profit
is $ 427.78/day and that of the manufacturer is $ 402.999/day. With this profit sharing
arrangement, each party’s daily profit is more than 30% larger than that achieved under
the retailer’s optimal policy. Thus, it is economically attractive for both parties to adopt
the jointly optimal policy yielded by our centralized model. If the manufacturer is more
powerful of the two parties, the terms of a corresponding profit sharing arrangement, can
also be derived easily along similar lines.
Finally, Table(B.1) and Table(B.2) also show the results for the decentralized models
where under monopolistic competition, the manufacturer can set its wholesale price, which
is now treated as a decision variable. Compared with the results for a given wholesale
price, the retailer’s individual optimal policy dictates increasing both the selling price from
$30.032/unit to $31.680/unit and the customer return reimbursement from $ 1.485/unit to
$ 1.498/unit. Consequently, the order quantity is reduced from 428.46 units to 388.392
units. These changes indicate that the retailer would expend less effort to increase market
demand and would tend to compensate by attempting to increase its revenue from returns.
This appears to be a rational response to a higher wholesale price. Also, as expected, the
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manufacturer’s share of the total supply chain profit now increases from 48.5% to 61.11%,
while, the total profits for the supply chain declines to $586.83/day. These effects, not un-
expectedly, tend to be magnified when the supplier is in a position to dictate the adoption
of its own optimal policy by the retailer. Now the total supply chain profit shrinks further
to $512.792/day, although the manufacturer’s relative share of this, as well as its own daily
profit go up substantially, albeit at the expense of the retailer.
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis
Based on the numerical example cited above, we conduct a focusedsensitivity analysis
to explore the effect of varying some selected parameters on system performance and the
decision variables, e.g., the total supply chain profit and the retailer’s share of it. We
vary each of the selected parameters in the range of 60% to 140% of their original values
cited in section 3.5 and record the percentage changes in the objective function value and
decision variables of interest. The results outlined below are about only those parameters
that significantly affect the selected target variables. “Significant” is defined as a larger than
±10% impact. Finally, the economic insights underlying the analyses are highlighted.
3.6.1 Selling Price
As can be seen in the Figures (C.3) through (C.6), the major factors which affect the
selling price of the new product are the parameters A and B in the demand function. The
effects of varying these two variables are similar in all the four situations examined, regardless
of whether the decision-making is decentralized or centralized or whether the wholesale price
is exogenous or endogenous. The selling price is an increasing function of the relative market
share (A) while it is a decreasing function of the elasticity of the demand(B). As can be
expected, the larger the market share, the higher the price the retailer can set. Also if
the product demand is relatively price-sensitive, the retailer tends to set a lower price to
increase demand, leading to higher profitability. However, if the new product is less price
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sensitive, there appears to be some sacrifice in the profit margin in order to increase profit.
In both the retailer controlled and the manufacturer controlled situation, as observed in
Figures (C.4) and (C.5), the wholesale price has a very strong impact on the decision of
setting the retail price. A higher wholesale price tends to lead to a higher retail price. Since
a higher wholesale price results in higher costs for the retailer, a higher selling price seems
to be necessary on its part.
3.6.2 Reimbursement Price
With respect to the reimbursement level for the returned product, the centralized deci-
sion maker is only concerned with the market share, A, and the production cost, cm, (refer
to Figure (C.7)). If the market share is sufficiently high, the retailer has little incentive
to increase the reimbursement price. In other words, the reimbursement price appears to
be quite stable if the retailer enjoys a relatively large market share. Nevertheless, as its
market share declines, the retailer tends to lack interest in collecting the returned products.
Consequently, the reimbursement price will be reduced quickly. Similar effects of the market
size on the reimbursement price can be found in the decentralized, the retailer controlled
and the manufacturer controlled situations.
Under decentralized decision making(refer to Figure (C.8) through (C.10), the reimburse-
ment, rm, the retailer obtains from the manufacturer for collecting the returns determines
the reimbursement price, rc, set by the former to induce customers to return the used prod-
uct. The positive relationship between these decision variables reflects the source of creating
incentives for obtaining end-user returns in the closed-loop supply chain.
Figure (C.10) indicates that if the wholesale price is not given exogenously in the man-
ufacturer controlled situation, the coefficient, a, of the return price in the return rate func-
tion, x = arc − bps, has a slightly negative impact on the reimbursement price. Since the
coefficient, a, along with the reimbursement price, rc, decide the return rate, the special
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relationship observed here illustrates that the customer return rate is likely to remain rela-
tively stable in the manufacturer controlled scenario.
3.6.3 Order Quantity
The analysis of the effect of varying individual model parameters on the order quan-
tity is more complex. As can be seen in Figure (C.11) through (C.14), the parameters
which have a significant influence on the order quantity differ remarkably depending on
the operating environment. As before, the relative market share measure, A, appears to
have a major impact on the order quantity under all cases examined. The parameter A
has positive relationships with the order quantity in the centralized, as well as the retailer
controlled situations, whereas, this relationship exhibits a curvature and a negative relation-
ship in the manufacturer controlled situation. This observation appears to be somewhat
counterintuitive. Under centralized control (refer to Figure (C.11) for the new product, sm,
in traditional EOQ model, and varies positively with the production rate, m. The holding
cost rate for the used and returned product, hrr, has a negative relationship with the order
quantity in the centralized situation.
In the retailer controlled scenario (refer to Figure (C.12), its relative market share, A,
and the price-sensitivity parameter, B, included in the demand rate function are major fac-
tors. At the same time, the changes in setup cost for returned product, Sr, and the holding
cost rate, hr, appear to affect the order quantity. In addition the wholesale price also tends
to impact the order quantity.
In the manufacturer controlled scenario (refer to Figures(C.13) and (C.14)) parameters
appear to be interrelated and complex in their interaction. Most of these, nevertheless, do
not appear to affect the order quantity within the range of parameter variations considered.
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3.6.4 Supply Chain Profits
As before, changes in the parameters, A and B, which define the market demand rate ap-
pear to appreciably impact the supply chain profit in all of the four operating environments
as can be seen in Figure (C.15)-(C.18). The total supply chain profit changes positively
with changes in market share, A, and negatively with changes in the price-demand sensitiv-
ity parameter, B. The production cost rate, as the cost for the input for the whole system,
tends to affect the supply chain profit in the centralized situation (see Figure (C.15)). In
the decentralized situations (as Figures (C.16) and (C.17) above), changes in the wholesale
prices, pw, has a slightly negative effect on total supply chain profit. In the manufacturer
controlled situation, the reimbursement price, rm, paid by the manufacturer to the retailer
to encourage the retailer to collect the returns, appears to significantly impact supply chain
profit. This implies that selecting the price to encourage the retailer to collect the returns,
under the manufacturer controlled situation should be given some attention. Otherwise, it
is likely to reduce the profitability of the entire supply chain.
3.6.5 Retailer’s Share in Supply Chain Profit
The parameters in the demand rate function, A and B, and the wholesale price, pw,
have major impacts on the retailer’s profit share ratio in both the retailer controlled and
the manufacturer controlled situations (see Figure (C.19) -(C.21)), if pw is not given. For
the latter case, as can be seen in Figure (C.20), increasing the reimbursement price, rm, set
by the manufacturer is likely to increase the retailer’s efforts in collecting the returns. If the
wholesale price is not given exogenously, the only major factor that seem to have an impact
on the retailer’s share in the supply chain profit is the unit production cost. None of the
other parameters appear to have any significant influence in this regard.
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3.7 Summary and Conclusions
In this study, we have developed mathematical models under a deterministic scenario,
for simultaneously determining the production/delivery lot size, the retail price and the cus-
tomer return reimbursement level for a single recoverable product in a two-echelon supply
chain consisting of a single retailer and a single lean manufacturer. Items returned by cus-
tomers at the retail level are refurbished and totally reintegrated into the manufacturer’s
existing production system for remanufacturing and are sold eventually as new products.
As in many lean manufacturing (JIT) environments, we assume a lot-for-lot operating mode
for production, procurement and distribution, as an effective mechanism for supply chain
coordination.
Decentralized models are developed and solved for determining profit maximizing op-
timal policies from the perspectives of both members of the supply chain. A centralized,
jointly optimal procedure for maximizing total supply chain profitability is also presented.
A numerical example illustrates that the centralized approach is substantively superior to
individual optimization, due to the elimination of double marginalization. The example
also outlines a fair and equitable proportional profit sharing scheme, which is economically
desirable from the standpoint of either member of the supply chain, for the purpose of im-
plementing the proposed centrally controlled model.
Of necessity, the simplifying assumptions made here (e.g. deterministic parameters and
the lot-for-lot modality), are the major limitations of this study. Embellishments by future
researchers, such as relaxation of the lot-for-lot assumption, incorporation of uncertainty,
more realistic and complex demand and product return functions, multiple products, manu-
facturers, etc. will, undoubtedly, lead to more refined remanufacturing and related models.
Furthermore, future efforts in this area should consider the development of integrated de-
cision models under stochastic conditions, which are likely to be more realistic from an
implementation standpoint. Nevertheless, the results obtained in this study are likely to be
68
of some value to practitioners as broad guidelines for integrated pricing, recoverable prod-
uct collection, production planning and inventory control decisions, as well as for designing
more streamlined, well-coordinated supply chains towards gaining competitive advantage.
We also hope that our efforts will prove to be useful for researchers in shedding light on
some of the intricate and inter-related aspects of product remanufacturing towards develop-
ing more effective decision making models for supply chain and reverse logistics management.
Finally, we have outlined the parametric conditions, (a), (b), (c) and (d), under
Proposition (3.4.1) and Proposition (3.4.3), for joint concavity, that are sufficient for yielding
globally optimal solutions for the various operating scenarios examined here. If, however, in
a given case, one or more of these conditions are violated, the respective solutions yielded
by our models represent merely local optima. The quality of such locally optimal solutions
with respect to truly global optima remains a matter for future research.
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4. Discrete Hierarchical Decision Making Problems in Biofuel Supply Chains
4.1 Introduction of the Biofuel Problem
Biofuel is a type of fuel derived from biomass and used for power and automotive trans-
port. Many crops such as wheat, corn, rapeseed and sunflower can be the resources to
produce biofuel. Recently, with more concerns over rising oil prices, gas emission effects
and rural development interests significantly drive the biofuel use and development. The
legislation, HB3543 signed by Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski in July 2007, requires “all
gasoline sold in the state to be blended with 10% bioethanol and all diesel fuel sold in the
state to be blended with 2% biodiesel” [75]. In order to break its dependence on imported
oil, the U.S. government now provides more funding, including $179 million for the Presi-
dent’s Biofuels Initiative[78] and $375 million by the Department of Energy[32], to reduce
the cost and improve the efficiency of biofuel production.
In this paper, we base our analysis closely on a model proposed in [11]. Government,
industry and farms form a supply chain through which material, product and currency flow.
Generally, there are three levels of decision making in this biofuel production problem:
• As a leader, the government plays an active role in encouraging biofuel production.
Under economical, environmental and social considerations, the government would like
to provide direct incentives such as tax exemptions to industry. Naturally, the cost to
the government is expected to be minimized while ensuring the required amounts of
production.
• Due to the high production cost of biofuel, industry expects more tax exemption from
goverment to ensure its own profit. Otherwise, industry has no incentive to replace oil
with biofuel products. The industry will determine the price paid to the farmers at
the gate.
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• Because of surging demand for biofuels, farms benefit by switching from producing
food crops to nonfood crops, which are the raw materials for biofuel production. Farms
choose among three options: planting food crops, growing nonfood crops or leaving a
part of the land fallow. The strategic plan needs to be set for the allowable land to be
better utilized to realize the maximum profits.
Models involving such decisions for biofuel production are typically formulated as bilevel
programming problems. At each level, a certain objective function needs to be optimized
without forcing lower levels to make suboptimal decisions.
• In the upper level problem, the government needs to minimize its total expenditure
by setting the optimal tax exemption level provided to the industry. Meanwhile, the
industry will determine the price paid to the farmers at the gate.
• In the lower level problem, farms decide the optimal assignments of allowable lands to
maximize their profits.
However, in order to ensure sufficient food and enough fuel, a license fee might be charged
if the farms sell crops as a biofuel resource. In addition, transportation and equipment costs
for nonfood crops may be incurred because of the new destination and purpose of the final
products. We categorize all these costs into fixed costs. As a result, the increased impor-
tance of the biofuel development program with fixed cost stimulated our interest to improve
modeling and solution methods used in the past. The introduction of binary variables is
essential in the agronomic practice and policy making, despite adding significant complexity
to the computation of the optimal solution.
In this study, we examine an instance with two types of biofuel: ester and ethanol.
Having only two such considerations allows us to use a grid search algorithm to handle the
upper level problem, as was proposed in [3]. For each instance of the lower level problem, we
use a cutting plane algorithm to handle the mixed-integer linear programming problem. By
using sensitivity analysis and warm-starts, we illustrate the efficient solution of a numerical
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example. We also investigate another approach based on nonsmooth nonlinear optimiza-
tion. We treat the dependence on the lower level as a nonlinearity in the upper level, and
apply a sequential quadratic programming method to solve government model, leading to
the introduction of quadratic penalty term to smooth farm’s model and the incorporation of
nonlinear mixed integer cuts. The efficiency of the extended method also has been examined.
4.2 Models
Using the notation introduced at the beginning of this dissertation, we introduce the
upper and lower level models.
4.2.1 The Goverment Model (Upper Level)
The upper level problem consists of the government model:
min
τ,p,xn
∑
v∈V,d∈D,e∈E
αdvexndeτv − γ
∑
e∈E,d∈D′
xnde (4.2.1)
subject to
∑
e∈E,d∈D
xnde ≥ ρθ
∑
e∈E
σe (4.2.2)
∑
e∈E,d∈D
αdvexnde ≤ uv ∀v ∈ V (4.2.3)
pde = max
v∈V
{(τv − pidv)αdve} ∀d ∈ D(v), e ∈ E (4.2.4)
pde ≥ 0, τv ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ V, d ∈ D, e ∈ E (4.2.5)
The objective (4.2.1) is to minimize the total value of tax credits provided by the govern-
ment after the savings to the government of not having to pay set-aside payments due to the
planting of certain nonfood crops on what would otherwise be fallow land. The conversion
rate α considers the rate of transferring the nonfood crops to biofuel for the industry as well
as the yield rate for each farm, which can vary significantly due to soil fertility and plant
72
nutrition. Inequality (4.2.2) ensures the minimum percentage of the total arable land to be
used for food crops. Constraints (4.2.3) limit the production of biofuel v to no more than
uv. These constraints explain the need for a certain amount of biofuel for the government,
but ensure that those biofuels with storage issues, such as ethanol, do not get produced
excessively. The next constraint (4.2.4) represents the industry’s problem to price the non-
food crops appropriately. The quantity pidv represents a threshold, which should be set large
enough to guarantee that the industry plants which convert the nonfood crops to biofuel
will make profit. The price, pde, is the price offered per unit of area and is equal to the price
offered per unit of weight of nonfood crop(independent of farm) multiplied by the yield of
the nonfood crop per unit area on farm e. Although not expressed in (4.2.1)-(4.2.5), the
variables xn are assumed to be in the set of optimal solutions for the lower level problem
parameterized by p, discussed next.
4.2.2 The Farms Model (Lower Level)
The lower level problem consists of the farms model:
max
xc,xn,xe,q
∑
e∈E,c∈C
mcexcce +
∑
e∈E,d∈D
(pde − cde)xnde + γ
∑
e∈E
xfe −
∑
e∈E,d∈D
qdetde (4.2.6)
subject to
∑
c∈C
xcce +
∑
d∈D
xnde + xfe ≤ σe, ∀e ∈ E (4.2.7)
∑
d∈D
xnde + xfe = θσe, ∀e ∈ E (4.2.8)
xcde + xnde ≤ χdeσe, ∀e ∈ E, d ∈ D (4.2.9)
xnde ≤ qdeσe, ∀e ∈ E, d ∈ D (4.2.10)
xfe ≤ δσe, ∀e ∈ E (4.2.11)
xcce ≥ 0, xnde ≥ 0, xfe ≥ 0, qde ∈ {0, 1}, ∀c ∈ C, d ∈ D, e ∈ E (4.2.12)
Function (4.2.6) is the objective function of the agriculture sector to maximize its profits
by assigning the total arable land among food crops, nonfood crops and fallow lands. In-
equality (4.2.7) confines the assignments to the total available land. Among them, a certain
amount of land, called set-aside land, is only used for nonfood crops and for keeping fallow
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in (4.2.8). Agronomic considerations are reflected in (4.2.9). For example, previous year’s
production levels, soil nutrient levels, or the amount of labor and equipment available can
limit the amount of land available for a type of crop. As such, for each nonfood crop, an
upper bound may also be given as a percentage of available land on each farm. (4.2.10) is
used to implement capacity constraints, where the value of qde determines whether or not
land is available at farm e to grow crop d. (4.2.11) gives the upper bound on the amount of
land left fallow. (4.2.12) ensures that all the continous variables are nonnegative and qde are
binary variables. Without the last term in the objective function (4.2.6) and the capacity
constraints (4.2.10), the model would turn into the biofuel model without fixed cost. The
inclusion of fixed costs affects the optimization methodology and the complexity.
4.3 Solution Methods
Two solution methods, grid search and nonsmooth nonlinear programming, are intro-
duced in [11] and varying degrees of efficiency and success are reported. The grid search
method can be applied even if the objective function is neither continuous nor differentiable.
However, the solution is at a low level of accuracy and the whole process is computationally
intensive. The nonlinear approach has the potential to reach a higher level of accuracy, but
[11] does not report much success with it as the algorithm is highly sensitive to the initial
point and the magnitude of the smoothing term.
In this paper, we chose to investigate the extension of these two solution methods to the
problem introduced in the previous section. In order to solve the discrete bilevel program-
ming problem obtained by introducing fixed costs into the biofuel model, we pay particular
attention to the handling of the integer variables. As a first solution method, we apply
a pattern search approach as a more efficient alternative to grid search for handling the
upper level problem, while solving the lower level problem using a cutting plane method for
mixed integer linear programming problems. As a second method, we also investigate the
use of nonsmooth nonlinear programming. For both approaches, sensitivity analysis and
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warm-starts are implemented to exploit efficiencies.
4.3.1 Pattern Search
In this paper, we are considering a problem instance with two types of biofuel, ester and
ethanol, so it is convenient to perform a pattern search to handle the upper level problem.
The pattern observed in the government objective function value and the feasible region
after solving the lower level problem for a few different pairs of τ values indicates potential
for success of the pattern search [54]. We have implemented the algorithm as follows:
Step 1: (Initialization)
(a) ζ = the minimum change of objective value
(b) lb = the lower bound for the step length
(c) δ = the factor to change the search length, usually δ ≤ 1
(d) Set up the initial starting point as τ i and the search length  as 0
Step 2: (Check the feasibility of the initial point τ i)
(a) Solve the lower level problem with p determined by τ i in the constraint (4.2.4)
(b) Substitute the optimal solutions of the lower level problem into the upper level
problem
(c) Check feasibility in the constraints (4.2.2) and (4.2.3) and calculate the objective
value U(τ i);
If feasible, go to Step 3;
Otherwise, randomly reselect a new start point τ i and go back to Step 1;
Step 3: (Start the search)
Search the neighborhood of τ i in all eight directions with step length as , thus we
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have the τ˜ i as
(
τ˜ iethanol, τ˜
i
ester
)
=

τ iethanol +  τ
i
ester
τ iethanol −  τ iester
τ iethanol τ
i
ester + 
τ iethanol τ
i
ester − 
τ iethanol +  τ
i
ester + 
τ iethanol −  τ iester + 
τ iethanol +  τ
i
ester − 
τ iethanol −  τ iester − 

Step 4: (Check the feasibility of the neighborhood):
(a) For each pair of τ˜ i, calculate the corresponding price p respectively ;
(b) Substitute into the lower level problem and solve the lower level problem
(c) Substitute the optimal solution of the lower level problem into the upper level
problem
(d) Check the feasibility in the constraints (4.2.2) and (4.2.3).
If none of τ˜ i can satisfy the constraints in the upper level problem,
If  ≤ lb conclude that the current solution cannot be improved;
Otherwise, let  = /δ and go back to the Step 3 to continue iterations
Otherwise, go to Step 5
Step 5: (Adjust step length at the original τ i as necessary ):
(a) Get the upper level objective value F (τ˜ ij) corresponding to each τ˜
i
j ;
(b) Set F (τ˜ i) = min
j
(F (τ˜ ij))
(c) If F (τ˜ i) ≥ F (τ),
If  ≤ lb conclude that the current solution cannot be improved;
Otherwise, let  = /δ and go back to the Step 2 to continue iterations
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Otherwise, go to Step 6
Step 6: (Move to the new τ i along the pattern as necessary):
(a) Stop and conclude optimal solution if F (τ i)− F (τ˜ i) ≤ ζ
(b) Otherwise, let τ i = τ˜ ij , where j ∈ argmin
j
F (τ˜ ij),  = 0, and go back to the Step
3 to continue iterations
This pattern search method greatly improves the computational efficiency over the tra-
ditional grid search. Instead of checking every pair of τ values in the possible area, pattern
search makes good use of the related information from the previous iterations and follows the
direction to further improve the objective value within the feasible region. Notice, however,
that the method would be less effective if a large number of decision variables are included
in the upper level problem.
The farms model
Because of the consideration of setup costs, the farms model given by (4.2.6)-(4.2.12) is a
mixed-integer linear programming problem. We use a mixed-integer cutting plane method to
solve this problem. Unlike branch-and-bound, which solves multiple problems with different
dictionary, cutting plane algorithm can get the optimal solution by using a single dictionary,
when the price is change, we can still use sensitivity analysis on the single dictionary.At each
iteration of the algorithm, we relax the binary constraints and apply parametric self-dual
simplex method [84].
Following the notation of the general bilevel problem with m2 = 0 and letting J denote
the index set of the integer variables, the lower level problem has the generalized form
max
y′
f(x, y′)
subject to Ay′ = h
y′j ≥ 0 for j /∈ J
y′j ∈ {0, 1} for j ∈ J .
(4.3.1)
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Note that in (4.3.1), the objective function is linear.
We partition the decision variables and the constraint coefficients as y′ =
 y′B
y′N
 and
A = [ AB AN ] according to the optimal basis using the index sets B and N . Then, the
constraint rows of the final dictionary can be written as:
y′B = A
−1
B h−A−1B AN y′N . (4.3.2)
For j ∈ J , if y′j /∈ {0, 1}, then we can add a Gomory mixed-integer cut to (4.3.2):
∑
j∈N∩J :aij−baijc≤hi−bhic
(aij − baijc)y′j
+
∑
j∈N∩J :aij−baijc>hi−bhic
(hi −
⌊
hi
⌋
)(1− aij + baijc)
1− hi +
⌊
hi
⌋ y′j
+
∑
j∈N/J :aij>0
aijy
′
j +
∑
j∈N/J :aij<0
hi −
⌊
hi
⌋
1− hi +
⌊
hi
⌋aijy′j ≥ 0
(4.3.3)
where aij is the (i, j)th element of A−1B AN and hi is the ith element of the vector A
−1
B h in
the final dictionary. Thus, the resulting cutting plane algorithm starts by relaxing all the
binary constraints and alternately solves the linear programming problem and adds cuts to
obtain a mixed integer solution.
Sensitivity analysis and warm-starts
If we investigate the lower level problem, we find that only the objective function coef-
ficients of the lower level problem depend on the decision variables τ from the upper level
problem, since p is the only component affected by the government’s choice. We know that
changes in the coefficients of the objective function may not change the optimal solution
and dictionary of the new problem, which means that in the pattern search framework we
might be able to skip solving some of the lower level problems. Even if the solution changes,
the previous optimum still remains feasible for the current problem, and starting the search
from the final dictionary of the previous problem may require fewer iterations to reach the
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new optimum. Therefore, after solving each lower level problem, we save the optimal basis
and reuse it as the starting basis for the solution of the next lower level problem. This
simple strategy seems to have a significant impact on the efficiency of the solution method,
as indicated by the numerical results presented in the next section.
4.3.2 Nonsmooth Nonlinear Optimization
Even though numerical results of the next section indicate good performance for the
pattern search method, it cannot be easily extended to larger problems due to the signif-
icant computational effort required to perform a search in multiple dimensions. Another
possible approach investigated in [11], albeit without much success, is nonsmooth nonlinear
programming. With this method, the government’s problem can be solved in one shot with
the lower level problem treated as a nonsmooth, nonlinear constraint. A gradient-based
nonlinear programming algorithm is used to solve the resulting problem, and the deriva-
tives associated with the lower-level problem are computed numerically after a smoothing
term is applied. In our numerical studies, we used the function fmincon in MATLAB which
implements a sequential quadratic programming algorithm and has built-in capabilities to
apply the finite differences method to numerically approximate derivatives by measuring
the average change in the objective function with respect to small changes in the decision
variables.
The government model.
For the upper level problem, the objective function (4.2.1) is an implicit function of the
decision variable τ since the optimal land assignments xn are determined as functions of p,
which is a function of τ as defined by (4.2.4). In other words, the general problem (1.2.1)
can also be written as
min
x∈X
F (x, y(x))
s.t. G(x, y(x)) ≥ 0,
(4.3.4)
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where y is now expressed as a function of x, and the definition of y as the solution of the
lower level problem is now treated as one of the nonlinear constraints G. Expressed as above,
(4.3.4) is now a single-level nonlinear programming problem. In order to use a gradient-based
approach to solve it, we need to evaluate the gradients of the objective function and the
constraints with respect to the decision variables x. We now outline the finite differences
approach used for the objective function, and the details of the constraint gradients are
identical.
Using the chain rule, the gradient of F in (4.3.4) can be expressed as
∇xF = ∂F (x, y)
∂x
+
∂F (x, y)
∂y
dy
dx
While we can explicitly formulate the partial derivatives of F with respect to x and y, y is a
nonsmooth function of x defined as the solution of the lower level problem. Because of the
definition, we can only evaluate dydx numerically, and we use the smoothing technique of [11]
to alleviate the nondifferentiability. This approach is outlined below.
If the derivative information can be obtained, (4.3.4) can be solved using any nonlinear
solver. As mentioned, we used fmincon in MATLAB as our solver. We will discuss the
numerical performance of this implementation in the next section.
The farms model.
In order to evaluate the function y(x) for the upper level problem, we need to solve the
lower-level problem once in each iteration of the nonlinear programming method. To do so,
we use the mixed-integer cutting plane approach outlined for the pattern search method.
In order to evaluate the derivative dydx for the upper level problem, we need to solve the
lower-level problem again after a small perturbation to x. However, if the optimal solution
of the lower-level problem does not change, the resulting numerical derivative will be zero,
or if the solution does change, it can be a significant change. This jump in the value of
the derivative is undesirable and may cause the overall algorithm to make erratic progress
and/or stall. In order to alleviate the effects of the jump, we introduce a smoothing term
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to the objective function of the lower level problem:
max
y′
f(xˆ, y′)− ψ‖y′ − y˜‖, (4.3.5)
where xˆ is the new, perturbed vector x, ψ > 0 is a smoothing parameter, and y˜ is the
solution of the problem at the original value of x. The quadratic penalty term smooths and
regularizes the objective function.
In our implementation, we introduce an intermediate variable ξ ∈ R and rewrite the
objective function as
max
y′,ξ
ξ. (4.3.6)
We also introduce a new nonlinear constraint
ξ − (f(xˆ, y′)− ψ‖y′ − y˜‖) ≤ 0 (4.3.7)
The reason for reformulating the nonlinear problem with a nonlinear objective function as
a nonlinear problem with a nonlinear constraints is to implement a cutting plane method
to solve the lower level problem. This allows us to reuse information gained by solving the
lower-level problem to evaluate the function y(x) for the current value of x and build on
the cutting plane method used to solve that mixed-integer linear programming problem.
As a result, in order to solve this mixed-integer nonlinear problem within the cutting-plane
framework, we apply an extended cutting plane method introduced by Westerlund et al. [87].
Starting with the optimal basis obtained by solving the mixed-integer linear programming
problem, we add the following linear cuts as necessary to obtain an optimal solution to the
smoothed-lower level problem:
∑
i∈J
(
∂f
∂y′i
|y′k)y′i +
∑
i/∈J
(
∂f
∂y′i
|y′k)y′i ≤ f(y′k)−
∑
i∈J
(
∂f
∂y′i
|y′k)y′ik −
∑
i/∈J
(
∂f
∂y′i
|y′k)y′ik (4.3.8)
Westerlund et al. ([87]) have proved convergence of this approach.
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4.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we provide a numerical example to illustrate the effect of fixed costs on
the model and its solution. Three farms of different size, σE1 = 3300 acres, σE2 = 14600
acres and σE3 = 6300 acres respectively, need to allocate their lands to plant 7 food crops.
Some of them can be used as nonfood crops to produce biofuels. Wheat, corn and sugar beet
could be converted to ethanol by industry. Rapeseed and sunflower can produce ester. We
used data consistent with [11] and filled any gaps in the data with further research into the
agricultural conditions in Europe. We use γ = 193.2 $/acre, θ = 0.35, δ = 0.1, uv = 100000
acres and ρ = 0.7674, and the rest of the data are shown in Tables (B.3, B.4 and B.5) .
4.4.1 Solutions
We coded the solution procedures in Matlab, Version 7.3.0.267(R2006b), then ran them
on a PC with Intel(R) Pentium(R)4 CPU at 3.20GHz, with 1.99 GB of RAM. Using the
pattern search method, we get the optimal land assignment for each food crop and each
nonfood crop in each farm listed in Table (B.6) and Table (B.7). We compare the results
with fixed costs to those without fixed costs in the same table to gauge the effect of fixed
costs on the optimal solution. When fixed costs are considered, the tax exemption level for
ethanol is reduced from 45.77($/ton) to 43.50($/ton), while the level for ester increases a
little bit from 3.93 ($/ton) to 3.95 ($/ton). With the change in the tax exemption levels,
there is a 16.42% decrease in the total cost for the government. Although the farms are
faced with an increased amount of costs, we observe that they do not produce less of the
nonfood crops, but instead change their allocation in response to the fixed costs. As a result,
the total profits of the farms decrease by 62.23%. It is obvious that fixed costs influence the
expenses of the government and the profits of the farms as well, which is consistent with
our intuition that the farmers would adjust their strategies, however, the total profit will be
reduced according to the extra costs since the farms would not like to take efforts to switch
from the food crops to nonfood crops. Simutaneously, the government might instead save
the expense with less land to be used to produce crops for biofuel.
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The same solutions were obtained by using the nonsmooth nonlinear programming ap-
proach. However, the nonsmooth nonlinear optimization is sensitive to initial points. Some
initial points drive the system to become stuck at the initial point without any improvement
or at an infeasible solution. For large enough values of the smoothing parameter and the
use of bounds to define tax exemption levels that produce feasible solutions for the upper
level problem, we were able to replicate the solution given in Table (B.6) and Table (B.7)
using the nonlinear programming approach.
4.4.2 Computational Efficiency
To evaluate the computational effort required by each solution approach, we compare
the points skipped and total iterations for each level of the pattern search in Table (B.8).
From the results of Table (B.8), we can observe our new method with sensitivity analy-
sis and warm-starts outperforms the one without sensitivity analysis and warm-starts. For
example, considering a searching step size of 25 at starting point (250, 250) in the case of
without fixed cost, 170 points have been skipped due to the use of sensitivity analysis and
warm-starts. If we treat the traditional method without warm-starts and sensitivity anal-
ysis as the base situation, we find that the proposed method could reduce the number of
iterations by 86.14%. Although there is no constant pattern for the amount of reduction,
the proposed method finds the optimal solution efificiently. In summary, we can solve the
discrete bilevel problem easily using our proposed new method for pattern search. The total
number of iterations it takes is just 27159, much less than 41031, which is for the approach
without sensitivity analysis and warm-starts. The CPU time also reduces significantly.
4.5 Conclusions
From the numerical example, we can see that there is a significant impact of the fixed
cost on the final decision and the profits which farms and the government share. In order
to encourage farms to produce nonfood crops in the presence of fixed costs, the government
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needs to provide more incentives. At the same time, farms also make their strategic plans
to assign land so that they can reach their maximum profit. The consideration of fixed cost
could reduce their profitability, however the loss could be controlled by changing the final
assignment of lands directly and easily.
From a computational point of view, we have demonstrated that efficient solution meth-
ods can be developed to solve this problem. By incorporating sensitivity analysis and
warm-starts into both of our solutions approaches, we have dramatically improved their
performance. While the practical applicability of the pattern search approach is limited to
problems with only a few variables in the upper-level problem, it can nevertheless be vi-
able with increasing computational power and memory. On the other hand, the nonsmooth
nonlinear programming approach allows us to get solutions quickly and with a good level of
accuracy if a good initial solution and reasonable variable bounds can be provided.
84
5. Conclusions and Future Extensions
5.1 General Conclusions
Hierarchical decision making involves multiple decision makers who make decisions in
a hierarchy of levels. This framework has wide application in technology development,
public policy, and business. Due to the complexity of the current marketplace and intensive
competition, more and more decision makers at different levels are getting actually involved.
The decisions at each level present profit opportunities for the decision maker at this level.
This framework also handles the interactions among different levels because the parameters
at any level may be determined by the reaction of another level. Therefore, it is important
to explore the nature of hierarchical decision making systems.
In this dissertation, applications of hierarchical decision making are provided in the con-
text of supply chain management, specifically in a remanufacturing setting and in a biofuel
production case. The relationship between suppliers and buyers, for instance, as the reman-
ufacturer and the retailer or the feedstock provider and the government/ the industry, can
be expressed by hierarchical decision making. Those decision makers pursue different objec-
tives and make decisions from their own perspectives. With more and more problem aspects
taken into consideration, the current solution methods for simple environments cannot sat-
isfy the need for examining more complex business problems. Particularly when discrete
decisions are involved, new solution procedures are often wanted. This work advances the
current literature by proposing algorithms for solving complex hierarchical programming
problems. This has been the motivation for conducting this research.
As the concepts of environment sustainability, lean production, and green manufacturing
have been widely accepted by the public, remanufacturing supply chain management has
become an importation research concern. This dissertation represents an early attempt
to consider acquisition management and inventory management in an integrated manner.
We have found explicit solutions for decentralized, as well as centralized scenarios and these
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solutions indicate that centralized decision making in remanufacturing leads to higher supply
chain profits. Subsequent numerical results and sensitivity analysis confirmed our theoretical
findings. Under our assumed deterministic scenario, sensitivity analysis indicates that the
relative market share and the elasticity of the demand significantly influence the optimal
decisions and the total profits.
The second application presented a case of biofuel production, representing the study of
a more complicated hierarchical decision making model. Recently, due to the pressures of
oil price increases and the potential shortage of food crops, intense debate has surrounded
government tax exemptions, which serves as an incentive to encourage biofuel production.
With data collected from real-world sources, we find that the government can set up the ap-
propriate policy to provide appropriate incentives for biofuel production and ensure enough
food crop output, as well. Unlike previous work in this area, we include fixed costs. Fixed
costs are a significant part of biofuel production costs for farms, and therefore our mod-
els make a very important contribution to the field by incorporating them into the model.
With recent advances in nonlinear programming and integer programming methods, we de-
velop solution methods for solving these types of problems. In this study, search methods
for derivative-free optimization are used to solve discrete bilevel problems, and smart im-
plementation techniques, such as sensitivity analysis and warm-starts, greatly improve the
performance of such solution procedures.
5.2 Suggested Future Research
The remanufacturing problem presented assumes a deterministic operating. In most
situations, industries such as electronic products OEM, such an assumption is unrealistic
environment. For example, the return rate is likely to depend on the price of new products,
a stochastic model can assume that the return rate would follow some distribution with a
mean value as a function of the collection price which the retailer pays to the customers.
In addition, the quality of the returns may also be uncertain, which leads to an uncertain
remanufacturing variable cost. This multilevel decision making problem in a stochastic
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environment needs further consideration and analysis.
Additionally, the simplifying assumptions made here on the model parameters and the
decision making scenario present further opportunities for extension of this research. For
instance, relaxation of the lot-for-lot assumption, incorporation of more realistic and complex
demand and product return functions, and the considerations of the multiple products and
manufacturers are likely to be more realistic and more complex to analysis.
Although the dissertation explores the solution algorithms and the applications of bilevel
programming, some extensions are expected to make it even more practical and convenient
to solve. We will continue to work on further improving the algorithm for the discrete bilevel
problem by focusing on computational efficiency. Our attempt to solve the discrete linear
bilevel problems in this paper will be further extended to solve other types of problems such
as discrete nonlinear bilevel problems and stochastic nonlinear problem. Once the time and
efforts to solve our discrete linear bilevel programming problems are further reduced, it will
provide the possibility to improve the computational efficiency to solve nonlinear discrete
bilevel programming problem.
There are possible extensions of the biofuel production model, as well. For example, if
the influence of food supply on food price is investigated, a Nash game can be integrated
in the farms’ level to form a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. If some
of the farms switch from the food crops production to the nonfood crops production, the
decrease in the production level of food crops leads to the increase in the price of food crops.
Comparing the new price of food crops with the price of nonfood crops, the production
level will be re-allocated among the total lands until final equilibrium is reached. If this
perspective has been considered, the market could adjust itself. The only concern is the
time lag.
Additionally, the biofuel models in this dissertation are deterministic models. In some
settings, some parameters which have been assumed to be known in this paper are not
certain. For example, weather is one of the uncertain factors. The change of the weather
results in different yield levels of the lands, which cannot be predicted by the farms before
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they organize the land assignments. However, if the farms take these stochastic factors into
consideration, their rational decisions showed focus on avoiding large variability in profits.
Finally, a third generation biofuel, produced from the biomass such as algae, will expand
our research area. Related topics such as considerations of transportation, logistics, and
inventory related factors can further extend and estabilish our biofuel models.
The adequacy of food supply is not only important to feed the world population, but
also essential to the stability of society. As the result, the social consideration of ensuring
enough food supply could be treated as an integral part of the goal of the government. In
future extensions of the model, we will include constraints in the governments model to
ensure the adequate and stable food supply. We will then assess whether the government
can provide an incentive structure to the farms to achieve this goal naturally or whether
legislation needs to be introduced to regulate individual farms obligations for growing food
crops. In the latter case, we will need to also add constraints to farms’ model.
Also called “green manufacturing”, remanufacturing considers reusing products instead
of merely disposing of them. Similarly, nonrenewable resources such as crude oil. Both ideas
play important roles in the study of Sustainability and should be emphasized in courses
such as production management, operations management, and supply chain management.
I would integrate those contents into my teaching and enforce students understanding of
these concepts, which will be essential in product design and operational strategy in our
current stages of production management. Furthermore, the bilevel program presented in
the dissertation also can be applied to illustrate to students the basic idea of game theory,
which will help them solve lots of practical problems in real business since hierarchical
structure has been widely used in contemporary management.
As we stressed in this dissertation, discrete bilevel programming problems have wide
applications in real business problem. We are looking forward to extending them to many
other problems. One of the potential applications is group decision making proble([49], where
each group member needs to solve his individual problem in the lower level problem while
the final selection has to be made with respect to the group member’s importance weight
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in the upper level problem. The multilevel problem is inter-connected because the objective
function values in the lower level problem are coefficients in the upper level problem. Also,
since the deciison variables in the upper level problem do not affect the lower level problem,
this type problem is easy to solve.
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Appendix A. Proof of Propositions in Remanufacturing Models
Note: All the proofs outlined are based on the following concepts: f is concave on D
if and only ∇2f(x) is a negative semi-definite matrix for all x ∈ D. An n × n matrix A is
negative semi-definite if and only if (−1)k|Ak| ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n} where Ak is the
upper left k-by-k corner of A.
Proof. Proposition (3.4.1)
If Q∗,r∗c ,p
∗
s obtained from (3.4.2),(3.4.3) and (3.4.4) are globally optimal, the sufficient
condition is that the objective function (3.3.2) should be jointly concave in these three vari-
ables. The Hessian matrix for (3.3.2) is:
D2Πr(Q, rc, ps) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2Πr
∂Q2
∂2Πr
∂Q∂rc
∂2Πr
∂Q∂ps
∂2Πr
∂Q∂rc
∂2Πr
∂r2c
∂2Πr
∂rc∂ps
∂2Πr
∂Q∂ps
∂2Πr
∂rc∂ps
∂2Πr
∂p2s
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−2Sr dQ3 −ahrr2d −BSrQ2 + bhrr2d − Bhrrx2d2
−ahrr2d −2a b− aBQhrr2d2
−BSrQ2 + bhrr2d − Bhrrx2d2 b− aBQhrr2d2 −2B + bBhrrQd2 − hrrB
2Q
d3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Thus,
|A1| = ∂
2Πr
∂Q2
= −2Sr d
Q3
≤ 0
Since all the parameters are strictly positive, |A1| ≤ 0 always holds. Also,
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|A2| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2Πr
∂Q2
∂2Πr
∂Q∂rc
∂2Πr
∂Q∂rc
∂2Πr
∂r2c
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−2Srd
Q3
−ahrr
2d
−ahrr
2d −2a
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = (
√
4aSrd
Q3
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ahrr
2d
)(
√
4aSrd
Q3
− ahrr
2d
) ≥ 0
Simplification of this expression leads to condition (a) under Proposition (3.4.1).
|A3| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2Πr
∂Q2
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∂Q∂rc
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=− 2Sr d
Q
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(−2a)(−2B + bBhrrQ
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− hrrB
2Q
d3
)− (b− aBQhrr
2d2
)2
]
− (ahrr
2d
)2(−2B + bBhrrQ
d2
− B
2hrrQ
d3
)
− (−ahrr
2d
)(
−BSr
Q2
+
bhrr
2d
− Bhrrx
2d2
)(b− aBQhrr
2d2
)
+ (
−BSr
Q2
+
bhrr
2d
− Bhrrx
2d2
)
[
(
−ahrr
2d
)(b− aBQhrr
2d2
)− (−2a)(−BSr
Q2
+
bhrr
2d
− Bhrrx
2d2
)
]
=
2aBhrrSr(Ab− aBrc)
2Q2d3
+
2DSrb2
Q3
+
a2Bh2rr
2d2
− 8aBDSr
Q3
+
2abhrrSr
Q2d
− abh
2
rr(Ab− aBrc)
2d3
+
2DB2S2r
Q4
+
ah2rr(Ab− aBr2c )
2d4
≤ 0
This implies condition (b) under proposition (3.4.1).
2
Proof. (Proposition 3.4.2)
Only when all the remanufacturing cost parameters are smaller than the corresponding cost
parameters associated with producing the product afresh, the producer would benefit from
a remanufacturing strategy. In addition, we check whether it is profitable for the producer
to resort to such a strategy. The profit per time unit for the manufacturer without reman-
ufacturing is
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Π
′
m = (pw − cs)d−
d
Q
(Sm + Srm + Si)− hmQd2m −
hmQd
2m
− hiQd
2m
− cmd
Comparing this with equation (3.3.4) it is clear that the manufacturer can benefit from
remanufacturing if Πm −Π′m ≥ 0, i.e.
−(rm + cr)x− hirQx
2
2md
− hiQ
2m
(
x2
d
− 2x) + cmx− crmx ≥ 0
This directly yields condition (e) under proposition (3.4.2).
2
Proof. (Proposition 3.4.3)
If Q∗∗∗,r∗∗∗c and p
∗∗∗
s obtained from (3.4.11), (3.4.13) and (3.4.14) are to be globally optimal,
the sufficient condition is that the objective function (3.3.5) should be jointly concave in
these three variables. The Hessian for the manufacturer’s profit function (3.3.4) is
D2Πm(Q, rc, ps) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2Πm
∂Q2
∂2Πm
∂Q∂ps
∂2Πm
∂Q∂rc
∂2Πm
∂Q∂rc
∂2Πm
∂p2s
∂2Πm
∂rc∂ps
∂2Πm
∂Q∂ps
∂2Πm
∂rc∂ps
∂2Πm
∂r2c
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
h11 h12 h13
h21 h22 h23
h31 h32 h33
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
where
h11 =
−2d(Sm + Srm + Si)
Q2
h22 =
−(hir − hi)Q(db− xB)2
md3
h33 = −−a
2Q(hir − hi)
md
h12 = h21 =
−B(Sm + Srm + Si)
Q2
+
Bhm − hi(2b−B)
2m
+
(2db−Bx)x(hir − hi)
2md2
h13 = h31 =
ahi
2m
− ax(hir − hi)
md
h23 = h32 =
aQ(hir − hi)(db− xB)
md2
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Set H = D2Πm(Q, rc, ps), then if H is negative semi-definite, the following must hold:
|H1| = ∂
2Πm
∂Q2
= h11 =
−2d(Sm + Srm + Si)
Q2
≤ 0
Since all variables and parameters are nonnegative, this requirement is always satisfied.
∣∣∣∣H12∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2Πm
∂Q2
∂2Πm
∂Q∂rc
∂2Πm
∂Q∂rc
∂2Πm
∂r2c
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
h11 h12
h21 h22
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 0
It can be easily verified that the above inequality results in condition (c) in Proposition
(3.4.3).
|H3| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2Πm
∂Q2
∂2Πm
∂Q∂ps
∂2Πm
∂Q∂rc
∂2Πm
∂Q∂ps
∂2Πm
∂p2s
∂2Πm
∂rc∂ps
∂2Πm
∂Q∂rc
∂2Πm
∂rc∂ps
∂2Πm
∂r2c
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
a2B2Q(hir − hi)(hi + hm)2
4m3d
− a
2B2Qxhi(hir − hi)(hi − hm)
m3d2
− a
2BQx2(hir − hi)(Bhirhi − 6bhirhi +Bhirhm − 5Bh2i + 6bh2i −Bhihm)
4m3d3
− a
2B2Qx3hi(hir − hi)2
m3d4
+
a2B2Qx4(hir − hi)3
4m3d5
+
a2B2(hir − hi)(Sm + Srm + Si)2
Q3md
− a
2B2(hir − hi)(hi − hm)(Sm + Srm + Si)
Qm2d
+
2a2B2xhi(hir − hi)(Sm + Srm + Si)
Qm2d2
− a
2B2x2(hir − hi)2(Sm + Srm + Si)
Qm2d3
≤ 0
Again, this inequality reduces to condition (d) in Proposition (3.4.3).
Conditions (c) and (d) are necessary to ensure that the profit function (3.3.4) of the
manufacturer is jointly concave with respect to Q∗, r∗c and p
∗
s. Also, as shown earlier,
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conditions (a) and (b) are sufficient for joint concavity of the retailer’s profit function (3.3.2).
Since the total supply chain profit (3.3.5) is the sum of (3.3.4) and (3.3.2), all four of these
conditions are necessary for it to be jointly concave in Q∗, r∗c , and p
∗
s.
2
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Appendix B. Tables
Table B.1: Summary of Results(1)
Q ps rc pw
(units) ($/unit) ($/unit) ($/unit)
Retailer’s given pw 428.5 30.032 1.485 20
optimal policy variable pw 388.4 31.680 1.498 23.286
Manufacturer’s given pw 6083.1 29.900 1.400 20
optimal policy variable pw 12146.0 32 1 24.138
Centralized 1562.4 23.3 0.5 -
optimal policy
Table B.2: Summary of Results(2)
d X
∏
r
∏
m
∏
s
(units/day) (units/day) ($/day) ($/day) ($/day)
Retailer’s given pw 29.904 19.391 318.361 299.918 618.279
optimal policy variable pw 24.960 19.299 228.215 358.616 585.830
Manufacturer’s given pw 30.200 18.000 275.698 377.596 653.293
optimal policy variable pw 24.000 16.000 113.753 399.039 512.792
Centralized 50.2 5.5 427.781* 402.999* 830.780
optimal policy
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Table B.3: Parameters Table (1)
pi α(ton/acre) χ
biofuel crops ($/ton) E1 E2 E3 E1 E2 E3
ethanol wheat -42.3 26.46 24.955 24.5 0.07 0.1 0.13
corn -49.3 30.4 30.4 34.2 0.12 0.11 0.08
sugar 33 28 28 28 0.14 0.07 0.1
ester rapeseed -4 50 50 50 0.08 0.13 0.11
sunflower 11 80 80 80 0.1 0.09 0.12
Table B.4: Parameters Table (2)
m($/acre)
crops E1 E2 E3
wheat 609.04 608.04 607.04
barley 121.2 123.2 125.2
corn 1813 1708 1713
sugar 200 200 200
rapeseed 472.8 272 272
sunflower 479.8 279 279
peas 234.3 231.3 230.3
Table B.5: Parameters Table (3)
t($) c($/acre)
crops E1 E2 E3 E1 E2 E3
wheat 1956000 299000 212000 1262.53 1262.53 1262.53
corn 200000 200000 200000 1164.25 1764.25 1764.25
sugar 200000 200000 200000 164.25 164.25 164.25
rapeseed 800000 200000 600000 162.52 162.52 162.52
sunflower 273000 270000 290000 236.42 232.52 252.52
103
Table B.6: Solution of the Numerical Example Without Fixed Cost
x(acres) F1 F2 F3
wheat 0 0 0
barley 0 0 0
corn 264 1606 504
sugar 0 0 0
rapeseed 264 730 567
sunflower 330 1314 756
peas 1287 5840 2268
xn(acres) F1 F2 F3
wheat 231 1460 819
corn 132 0 0
sugar 462 1022 630
rapeseed 0 1168 126
sunflower 0 0 0
xf(acre) 330 1460 630
τester($/ton) 3.93 τethanol($/ton) 45.77
govobj ($) 5747435 farmobj($) 11219413
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Table B.7: Solution of the Numerical Example with Fixed Cost
x(acres) F1 F2 F3
wheat 0 0 0
barley 0 0 0
corn 264 1606 504
sugar 0 0 0
rapeseed 264 0 567
sunflower 330 1314 756
peas 1287 6570 2268
xn(acres) F1 F2 F3
wheat 231 1460 819
corn 132 0 0
sugar 462 292 630
rapeseed 0 1898 126
sunflower 0 0 0
xf(acres) 330 1460 630
τester($/ton) 3.95 τethanol($/ton) 43.50
govobj($) 4828156 farmobj($) 6915626
Table B.8: Computational Efficiency of the Proposed Solution Methods
(τ0ester, τ
0
ethanol) = (250, 250), 0 = 25
CPU time iterations skipped points
without sensitivity analysis 21.32 24371 0
and warm-starts without fixed cost
with sensitivity analysis 8.05 3379 170
and warm-starts without fixed cost
without sensitivity analysis 105.40 46961 0
and warm-starts with fixed cost
with sensitivity analysis 75.92 27483 13
and warm-starts with fixed cost
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Appendix C. Figures and Graphics
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Figure C.1: The Recovery and Remanufacturing Process
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Figure C.2: Inventory Time Plot
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Figure C.3: ps vs. Parameters in the Centralized Situation
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Figure C.4: ps vs. Parameters in the Retailer Controlled Situation
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Figure C.5: ps vs. Parameters in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw given)
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Figure C.6: ps vs. Parameters in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw not given)
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Figure C.7: rc vs. Parameters in the Centralized Situation
112
Figure C.8: rc vs. Parameters in the Retailer Controlled Situation
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Figure C.9: rc vs. Parameters in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw given)
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Figure C.10: rc vs. Parameters in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw not given)
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Figure C.11: Q vs. Parameters in the Centralized Situation
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Figure C.12: Q vs. Parameters in the Retailer Controlled Situation
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Figure C.13: Q vs. Parameters in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw given)
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Figure C.14: Q vs. Parameters in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw not given)
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Figure C.15: Supply Chain Profits in the Retailer Controlled Situation
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Figure C.16: Supply Chain Profits in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw given)
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Figure C.17: Supply Chain Profits in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw given)
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Figure C.18: Supply Chain Profits in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw not given)
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Figure C.19: Πr/Πs in the Retailer Controlled Situation
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Figure C.20: Πr/Πs in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw given)
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Figure C.21: Πr/Πs in the Manufacturer Controlled Situation (pw not given)
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